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ABSTRACT
For critical systems, timely recognition of an anomalous condition immediately starts the
evaluation process. For complex systems, isolating the fault to a component or subsystem results
in corrective action sooner so that undesired consequences may be minimized. There are many
unique anomaly detection and fault isolation capabilities available with innovative techniques to
quickly discover an issue and identify the underlying problems.

This research develops a framework to aid in the selection of appropriate anomaly detection and
fault isolation technology to augment a given system. To optimize this process, the framework
employs a model based systems engineering approach. Specifically, a SysML model is
generated that enables a system-level evaluation of alternative detection and isolation techniques,
and subsequently identifies the preferable application(s) from these technologies

A case study is conducted on a cryogenic liquid hydrogen system that was used to fuel the Space
Shuttles at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida (and will be used to fuel the next generation Space
Launch System rocket). This system is operated remotely and supports time-critical and highly
hazardous operations making it a good candidate to augment with this technology. As the
process depicted by the framework down-selects to potential applications for consideration, these
too are tested in their ability to achieve required goals.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Space operation missions are of a critical nature. This is due to the large expense associated with
such missions, many of which have interrelated costs approaching, or exceeding, billions of
dollars. In addition, space exploration missions often have small windows with limited chances
to recover from issues that may occur, and complete the mission successfully. Once committed
to a given phase during these missions, opportunities for do-overs are rare. Adding to this
criticality is that space operation systems require highly hazardous commodities to propel, power
and operate the various systems. This adds a safety factor both for those participating in crewed
missions as well as those involved in ground processing of the launch vehicle and spacecraft.

These spacecraft are comprised of numerous complex systems. This includes the equipment that
makeup the spacecraft used for delivery, and the various payloads and science instruments used
to meet the research objectives. Accompanying this complexity will be the assorted
complications. As individual components do not always operate as projected, some failures are
to be expected. This is further compounded as the system’s complexity increases. With payload
costs just recently starting to approach $1000 per pound (a tenth of that experienced by the space
shuttle) (SpaceX, 2011), designers must still strike a balance between system redundancy, sensor
allocation and hardware weight. An absence of redundancy minimizes the options an operator
has should a failure occur. A lack of instrumentation limits visibility into system performance.

For many systems, timely recognition of an anomalous situation means the issue gets evaluated
and a course of action is decided on quickly. Taking corrective action sooner can help minimize
1

damage generated from off-nominal conditions, or avoid serious outcomes for those problems
that can escalate rapidly. The ability to quickly detect and identify anomalies that arise is vital
for critical space operations.

Anomaly Detection
One of the earlier definitions of ‘anomaly’ is that it is an observation that appears to deviate
markedly from other members of the sample in which it occurs (Grubbs, 1969). More recent
definitions conclude that anomalies (or outliers) are patterns in the data that do not conform to a
well-defined notion of normal behavior (Chandola, Banerjee, & Kumar, 2009). Anomaly
detection is a recurring term found within the academic literature and has been applied to a
variety of fields. One of these fields, and the one applicable to this topic, includes health
management of complex systems. For this research project, anomaly detection will be referred
to as the ability to uncover abnormalities that arise. This term is more comprehensive than ‘fault
detection’ (also common in the literature) as it also includes anomalies generated by
environmental influences or operational circumstances.

In many cases, space operation systems are predisposed to take advantage of anomaly detection
applications. This not only applies to actual space missions that rely on autonomous designs, but
also includes supporting ground systems. Do to the hazardous nature of testing and launch
support environments, many of the ground systems are operated remotely. As processes
operating via remote command and control (C&C) rely on (limited) sensor information, anomaly
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detection capabilities can supplement the flow of useful information to the operators based on
various techniques used to evaluate the sensor data.

Anomaly detection routinely involves one or more people to monitor the system measurements.
The primary method of anomaly detection is to bind the sensor data to predetermined limit
exceptions. If an excursion from these limits occurs, an operator is alerted who then assesses the
significance of the exception. This method is reliant on an operator with sufficient domain
knowledge to take appropriate action, and subsequently, a large number of experts may be
employed for complex systems. Operators too can monitor the data real-time or during postoperation analysis. However, with limited display space, it is impractical to have visibility for
every remote sensor in a complex system. This is further hindered in that an operator can only
focus on a smaller subset of displayed data. Therefore, the operator relies heavily on the
automated monitoring of the entire sensor array. This reliance means an operator could benefit
considerably from an enhanced anomaly detection capability.

The predominant method for developing an anomaly detection system is to select one or more
applications that may fit one's needs. The selection process may be limited to what is readily
available, and a scrub against the system requirements may end up diminished. After these
modules are selected, development then starts on a system-level architecture that can integrate
the various elements into the current design. As this is a niche application, a certain amount of
tailoring will be required to render the forthcoming architecture functional. An application that
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is not a good fit can amass excessive development hours in an effort to make the system
operational.

Fault Isolation
Detecting an anomaly is the first half of providing the operator with the vital data necessary to
develop a course of action. After an anomaly has been detected, the other half of the process
(and equally important) is to isolate the fault within the system. Isolation to a component or
subassembly provides the domain experts with the essential information necessary to respond
and possibly remedy the situation. Fault isolation will optimally be able to point to a specific
source. However, a lack of sensor information often leads to uncertainty which can result in an
inadequate diagnosis. It is often the case that the initial data related to the anomaly is not
sufficient to pinpoint the original problem, and involve additional troubleshooting to find the
cause. This may result in an initial isolation of the problem to an upper subsystem level. In this
limited-visibility scenario, it would not be unusual to have multiple suspect subassemblies and/or
components identified.

In addition to issues related to limited sensor data, system complexity can make the fault
isolation process arduous. The task of isolating to a fault entails assessing all possible
contributors to the problem, each with varying degrees of sensor coverage. For a complex
system, these contributors can number into the hundreds and possibly thousands. A fault that
yields additional damage compounds the problem as one must differentiate if that damage is
collateral to a single fault or originating from an entirely different fault source.
4

Problem Statement
There are many types of anomaly detection and fault isolation techniques described within the
academic literature. Some of these applications are specific to a given system or to a type of
problem, while others cover a wider spectrum of cases in general context. In addition, they have
varying degrees of effectiveness. Complex systems may require several anomaly detectors and
fault isolators to provide an adequate discovery capability. These diverse applications may target
different areas of a system, or may focus on a specific concern and work independently to
provide consensus that an anomaly is occurring or the fault source has been determined.

Although a multitude of anomaly detection and fault isolation programs can be found in the
research literature, there does not appear to be any work published on architectural templates that
could take advantage of multiple programs and integrate them into the desired systems. More
specifically, there is an absence of a methodological process for generating anomaly detection
and fault isolation designs to either embed within new system concepts, or supplement existing
schemes.

Research Objectives
An architectural framework template is being considered that assists with anomaly detection and
fault isolation module selection. Such a framework would consider the user requirements and
then be able to model the proposed system. This will enhance the module selection process and
thereby optimizing the detection/isolation suite. Such a model will assist the developers when it
comes time to implement the system. The primary objectives of this research include:
5

•

Develop an architectural framework template using system engineering principles

that standardizes how users can model a system augmented with detection/isolation
capabilities
•

Based on architectural analysis, provide a methodology that can determine an

optimal suite of detectors and isolators that best meet the user requirements.
•

Generate a model that can integrate the detector components into the system and

provide a basis to directly produce design implementation documentation
•

Verify and validate the model by experimentation using actual space operation

systems data

Research Contributions
The importance of anomaly detection and fault isolation is already valued by those operating
complex and critical systems. This is consistent with the amount of work devoted to
development of these methods and the abundance of techniques that currently exist. Many of
these detectors and isolators are developed for specific applications with a very narrow field of
focus.

The primary contribution of this research effort is realizing a conceptual model that assists users
in generating anomaly detection and fault isolation schema. This research should extend the
contributions of those development efforts by providing a means to organize the
detectors/isolators for ingestion into the model, and subsequently, acceptance for use should the

6

capabilities meet the desired requirements (or rejection of the detector/isolator should they not).
The secondary contributions should then include:
•

Couple anomaly detectors and/or fault isolators with unique applications for

which they were never intended, but could benefit from the underlying detection/isolation
techniques
•

Improve accuracy in anomaly detection and fault isolation capabilities by pairing

those deemed optimal for the given environment in which they will operate

Dissertation Organization
This chapter provides an introduction to the anomaly detection/fault isolation topic, and how this
research effort will focus on developing an architectural framework for inclusion of these
technologies for space operation systems.

Chapter 2 will survey the academic literature for relevant anomaly detection and fault isolation
technologies. This review will also encompass system engineering techniques that may support
development of an architectural framework. A gap analysis is then performed to determine
where a need might exist to extend the prevailing level of research.

Chapter 3 will discuss the methodologies and procedures used to conduct the research effort.
This includes an outline of the research design for the proposed framework, rationale of the
methodologies used, type and source of the information needed and analysis of the data gathered.

7

Chapter 4 focuses on developing the proposed framework. This consists of examination of the
detection/isolation techniques and a means to organize these applications by variables that
support the architectural design. System engineering practices will provide the foundation for
model development.

Chapter 5 will present a space-operations related case study that showcases an implementation of
the proposed framework.

Chapter 6 centers on the analysis of the case study. This chapter will also validate the model
being generated.

Chapter 7 will summarize the research results, provide concluding remarks, and offer
recommendations for future work.

8

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Purpose
To formulate a conceptual architecture addressing anomaly detection and fault isolation, a
comprehensive literature review was conducted. The rationale for conducting the review was
twofold. First, a thorough review aids in bounding the research problem and directing the path
forward. This is accomplished by identifying the existing work, and from that, recognizing
which areas within the field of study that can benefit from additional inquiry. These ‘gaps’
enable the narrowing of the designated field to either a new study domain or one that extends
existing research, thus avoiding duplicate efforts that have already taken place. A gap analysis
will further assist with differentiating those areas that could benefit from additional study.

The second reason is that a literature review expands insight into the chosen topic. A review is
necessary to assess the related prevailing concepts. More specifically, the review includes
discovering the various detection/isolation methodologies already developed and understanding
the variables that make up the different technologies. Insight is also gained by identifying
relationships among the applications and realizing different perspectives for implementing within
diverse systems.

One objective of the review was to identify the current scope of anomaly detection and fault
isolation applications. This includes existing technology that may already be in use, conceptual
designs not yet implemented or paired with a system, or any related emerging technologies. The
other review objective was to attain relevant system engineering methodologies that could be
9

used to build an architectural framework that forms a standard model to support future
implementation. This chapter surveys the relevant academic literature related to these topics and
provides a baseline from which advancement by new research can be appraised.

Anomaly Detectors
Numerous models are available in both model-based and data-driven classes. The algorithms
involved tend to be ‘specialists’ in that they are most effective for selective failure modes and/or
component types. Anomaly detection is typically accomplished by a rule or signal-based
method. However, data-driven models have found a niche for possible better performance in
complex, dynamical systems, an important factor for critical systems.

Data-Driven Models
One area of anomaly detection that is getting considerable attention involves a data-driven
approach. This involves developing a knowledgebase of data depicting normal behavior which
becomes a baseline set for comparison. Abnormal behavior is then described as incidents were
the data behavior diverges from the baseline. Data-driven models tend to disregard the physics
behind the data and instead focus on the differences behind the dataset standard and test case
data. Hence, an advantage of data-driven models is that the developers do not require domain
knowledge of the system under study nor do they need to model the system specifics. Such a
design allows for distribution across multiple system platforms with little (if any) modification.
In addition, the requisite system knowledge is captured in the training datasets. These datasets
can also be expanded as nominal operational data is collected (D. Iverson et al., 2012).
10

Developing the model will require some system subject matter expert (SME) input to identify
related subsystem sensor data. The SME can also characterize the sensors based on criticality.
This information can be used to adjust sensitivity levels and establishing threshold values. This
data-driven method appears to be a simple approach, but does have its challenges as stated below
by (Chandola et al., 2009):
•

Defining a normal region that encompasses every possible normal behavior is

very difficult. In addition, the boundary between normal and anomalous behavior is often
not precise. Thus an anomalous observation that lies close to the boundary can actually
be normal, and vice versa.
•

In many domains normal behavior keeps evolving and a current notion of normal

behavior might not be sufficiently representative in the future.
•

The exact notion of an anomaly is different for different application domains. For

example, in the medical domain a small deviation from normal (e.g., fluctuations in body
temperature) might be an anomaly, while similar deviation in the stock market domain
(e.g., fluctuations in the value of a stock) might be considered as normal. Thus applying a
technique developed in one domain to another, is not straightforward.
•

Availability of labeled data for training/validation of models used by anomaly

detection techniques is usually a major issue.
•

Often the data contains noise that tends to be similar to the actual anomalies and

hence is difficult to distinguish and remove. (p. 15:3)
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For data driven models, the baseline dataset is often referred to as the ‘training’ data. The
training data itself has different classifications based on what is known about this dataset. A
supervised dataset is one that combines known anomalies with known normal data. Such a
dataset is considered labeled accordingly (anomaly and normal). A semi-supervised dataset
contains only normal data and an unsupervised data set does not have any labels (Omar, Ngadi,
& Jebur, 2013). In many cases, obtaining labeled datasets is not at all practical for complex
systems. For anomaly sets, this requires simulating the anomalies to a resolution that closely
mimics real-world. Fabricating anomalies such that the issue is fully propagated throughout the
system can be both a difficult and comprehensive task. The alternative to simulation is actually
experiencing the anomaly numerous times. This (of course) is not the optimal approach to
developing a training dataset and would only be practical if a hardware failure could be
simulated without system collateral damage.

Models/Algorithms
There is an assortment of algorithms that have been developed and applied to many complex
system applications. Due to the longevity of the Space Shuttle program, its unique need for
anomaly detection capabilities, complexity, and NASA’s inherent goal to support scientific
research, it has been the subject of numerous studies and testing related to algorithm
development. The simplest type of anomaly is classified as a ‘point anomaly.’ This is “an
instance of the data that has been found to be anomalous with respect to the rest of the data”
(Gogoi, Bhattacharyya, Borah, & Kalita, 2011). As this includes the data found with sensor
arrays under study, the anomaly detection methods will only address this type of anomaly. In a
12

majority of applications, this is the type of anomaly occurs most often, and a good amount of
research addresses this issue. The following list summarizes the various point-type anomaly
detection methodologies as described by (Chandola et al., 2009).
•

•

Classification
o

Neural Networks

o

Bayesian Networks

o

Support Vector Machines

o

Rule-Based

Nearest Neighbor
o

Kth Nearest Neighbor (K-NN)

o

Relative Density

•

Clustering

•

Statistical
o

o

Parametric Techniques


Gaussian Model



Regression Model



Mixture of Parametric Distributions

Non-Parametric Techniques


Histograms



Kernal Function

•

Information Theoretic

•

Spectral
13

All of these techniques will be given consideration for inclusion in the anomaly detection
architecture. Using the classifications from the list above, the following sections will review
some of the anomaly detection research that has already been applied to space operation systems.

Rule Based
The primary method currently used for anomaly detection is an exception notification
methodology which could be considered a derivation of a rule-based practice. Although
Chandola et al describe this method as requiring a rule-learning algorithm, due to both the
criticality and reliance of this methodology, the rules are predesigned and embedded within the
controlling application.

The rules are quite simple. Each analog parameter is given an upper and/or lower exception
limit value that encompasses the nominal range (also called signal-based). The exception limit
for a discrete variable is the opposite of its current state. If an exception to these limits occur, the
operator is alerted. Exception limits can be generated to protect either the design or operational
limits of the system. As the operational environment changes, limit settings can be widened or
inhibited so as not to alert on nominal transient responses, and then reset to the newly desired
limits for that phase of the operation. Note that transient operations often create ‘blind-spots’
while monitoring the system as anomaly detection works best with stable processes. For
hazardous, time-critical or hardware-concern issues, exception limits are often used as trigger-
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points to initiate additional rules (i.e. turning off a failed sensor or switching from a primary to a
secondary system).

Nearest Neighbor
The nearest neighbor approach is based on an assumption that related data tends to group in
dense neighborhoods. Anomalies are those outliers that are found some distance away from the
closest neighbor (Chandola et al., 2009).

An anomaly detection method called Orca (Bay & Schwabacher, 2003) uses a nearest neighbor
based algorithm to determine outliers. To minimize the computational time, it employs a pruning
technique which allows it to perform in near linear time. Orca calculates a weighted average of
the Euclidian distance for the numerical values and a Hanning distance for the discrete variables.
The output from Orca is a distance score which represents the average distance to its k-nearest
neighbors. The further away the nearest neighbors, the more anomalous the data correlating to a
higher score. Orca has been used to detect anomalies in the Space Shuttle main engines (SSME)
during both flight and engine test-stand runs (Abdul-Aziz, Woike, Oza, Matthews, & lekki,
2011) (M. Schwabacher, Oza, & Matthews, 2009).

Clustering Algorithms
In a clustering-based approach to outlier detection, the “key assumption made is that large and
dense clusters have normal data. The data which do not belong to any cluster or small clusters
(low dense clusters) are considered outliers” (Murugavel & Punithavalli, 2011).
15

A data-driven application called Inductive Monitoring System (IMS) is a distance-based
anomaly detection tool that uses a clustering technique. The data structure used for distancebased analysis is a vector of concurrent values from related system parameters. IMS reads realtime (or archived) data and formats it into a vector structure. It then searches the knowledgebase
of nominal data (training data) and returns the distance between real-time and the nearest
nominal data vectors (Matthews, Srivastava, Iverson, Beil, & Lane, 2011) (Martin, Schwabacher,
& Matthews, 2010). When the real-time data is consistent with nominal, this difference is close
to zero. If the data vectors start to diverge, an increase in the vector differences is noted and the
real-time data is then deemed ‘out-of-family.’ This can be an indication of an anomaly that is
occurring.

It should be noted that the real-time data is being compared to previous collected empirical data.
Thus, an out-of-family indication can also reflect a normal condition that was not fully
characterized within the nominal data sets used to ‘train’ the model. The IMS application works
well with unsupervised data which is likely the only type of data available for most large
complex systems. Unsupervised means there is an assumption of normalcy, but a potential exists
that undetected anomalies are embedded within such data sets. In these cases, IMS could treat
some anomaly precursors as nominal, requiring even greater vector disparity before getting
flagged as anomalous.

16

IMS has been used for anomaly detection testing in the Space Shuttle (wings, main engines) and
ground launch systems. In addition, it is currently used to monitor Space Station subsystems
(Matthews et al., 2011). Reference Figure 1 - Anomaly Detection Process Flow Example for a
process flow example using a data-driven distance-based anomaly detection model.

Figure 1 - Anomaly Detection Process Flow Example

Neural Network
A neural network is trained on a nominal reference data set to learn the different normal classes.
Each test occurrence is then submitted as an input to the neural network. If accepted, the test
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instance is deemed normal, and if rejected, anomalous (De Stefano, Sansone, & Vento, 2000)
(Chandola et al., 2009).

NASA started the Methane Thruster Test-Bed Project (MTTP) as a platform for research of
plume diagnostics and Integrated System Health Management ISHM. A method to validate the
sensors was developed using an auto-associative neural network (AANN). Archived data was
used to train and test the (AANN) for sensor validation. Sensor faults ranging from hard (loss of
power or over powered which would drive the sensor off-scale low or high) to soft (indication
drifts from actual) were artificially injected. The AANN was able to detect the faults from
within the pressure sensor data as well as predict the values of the pressure measurement to a
reasonable degree (Russell, Lecakes, Mandayam, & Jensen, 2011).

Statistical/Parametric
A regression analysis for anomaly detection requires that the individual data be fitted to the
regression model. The focus is then on the residuals as these represent data that the regression
model could not explain. The anomaly score is an accumulation of divergence values of the
residuals from the model.

A Beacon-based Exception Analysis for Multi-missions (BEAM) tool was developed by the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to monitor autonomous space systems. This application was then
modified to support the monitoring of the Space Shuttle main engines during both flight (realtime) and post-flight analysis (or post-test for ground testing). The anomaly detection module
18

for this application is called Dynamical Invariant Anomaly Detector (DIAD). The DIAD
element performs a parametric estimate of the residuals based on a single quantitative
measurement. It is believed that the ‘dynamical invariants’ are less sensitive to operational
influences and impacted more by internal changes to the system dynamics (Park et al., 2002).

A method of generating an adaptive anomaly detection threshold using interval models has been
proposed by (Puig, Quevedo, Escobet, Nejjari, & de las Heras, 2008). This concept was adapted
to monitor a propellant ground controlled linear-actuated valve used for rocket engine testing at
the Stennis Space Center (SSC). Nominal data was obtained from both the performance and
simulated operations of the valve under study. A number of autoregressive moving average
(ARMA) models are generated so that the valve’s behavior is satisfactorily represented based on
the control data (this can be a trial-and-error process) (Russell et al., 2011). The valve’s control
pressure was adjusted such that the valve could not close completely, thus simulating an
obstruction which is subsequently detected as a fault by the model. It should be noted that
applying this method of simulation, manipulating control parameters to achieve a desired result,
negates the use of those control outputs for the nominal data set (often, these outputs are
monitored to determine valve performance).

One-Class Support Vector Machines
Support vector machines (SVM) map the input vector into a higher-dimensional feature space
and then separates the nominal data from anomalous in that feature space (one-class refers to the
possibility that only normal data is available). A separating hyper-plane is determined by
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support vectors (a subset of the training data) rather than the whole training samples and thus is
extremely robust to outliers. The training and test cases are represented using a kernel function
that returns the distances between pairs of examples. The anomaly score reported is the distance
from the test data point to the hyper-plane as measured in feature space. One-class SVMs have
been used to detect anomalies in the SSMEs during both flight and engine test-stand runs
(Abdul-Aziz et al., 2011) (Omar et al., 2013) (M. Schwabacher et al., 2009).

Fault Isolators
With an overabundant number of potential fault sources for a given anomaly, it would be ideal to
have a model that can automate the fault isolation process. This provides the capability to
ascertain each of the possible failure scenarios, and utilize the entire sensor array to evaluate
each case. In those instances when multiple fault sources or subsystems are identified, the model
can rank the potential candidates and present them in order of those deemed ‘most-likely.’ For
time and safety critical circumstances, the initial system-safe actions can be automated to trigger
based on the type of fault identified. To accomplish this, the fault isolation algorithm must
recognize the failure type, locate the failure position and detecting the extent of the failure (Wu,
2005).

Data-driven detection models are indifferent to the physics behind the sensor data as they devote
their attention to abnormalities found within the data. However, fault isolation models require
system knowledge to accurately pinpoint the source of the fault. There are cases where data
observation alone will be able to identify the faulty component. For instance, an analog sensor
20

with a nominal indication (approximately midscale) goes off-scale low or high in a single sample
step (an electronically high sample rate is assumed). Typically, such a rate of change would be a
physical impossibility for that system. Therefore, a model could accurately conclude the sensor
itself has failed. Conversely, if the sensor indication just starts drifting away from nominal, the
challenge is then determining if the sensor is reporting system dynamics accurately, or if in fact,
the sensor is failed. Note that a sensor is also just one component in a command and control
system that leads back to an operator. This requires additional corroborating data combined with
system knowledge (for both Process and C&C systems). This highlights that the fault source
may occur at any point from the C&C work station to the remote system being operated
(reference Figure 2 - Potential System Fault Sources). A supervised data-driven model has the
capability to accomplish this task, but this requires a bank of anomaly classified datasets (a
method of archiving system knowledge). As stated earlier in this paper, deriving anomaly
classification datasets is likely an impractical option for complex systems.

Commands

Remote
C&C

Local
C&C

Sensor
Array

System

Processing

Sensor Data

Control
Room

Signal Transmission

Remote System

(RF, Wire, Fiber Optics)

(Satellite, Launch Pad, Space Craft)

Processing

Figure 2 - Potential System Fault Sources
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Fault Isolation Models
The following is a review of fault isolation research that is being applied to space operation
systems. The emphasis is on work that supports large-scale complex systems (vs. isolation at the
component level or smaller subsystems). All of these techniques will be given consideration for
inclusion in the fault isolation portion of the proposed architecture.

Physics Model
Physics-based modeling that accurately represents the system can be adapted to perform fault
isolation duties. A physics model captures the system knowledge within mathematical formulas
that define the system. Therefore, such a model will ‘understand’ the system dynamics to
include areas not covered by instrumentation, an advantage that overcomes limited sensor
deployment. A physics model can be used to simulate a given system, and failures can be
injected and subsequent outcomes recorded. The expectation is the model will fully propagate
the issue throughout the system. This methodology can be used to develop anomaly cases that
could support both detection and isolation. For unknown problems, one can alter the parameters
of a high-resolution model to match suspect failures until an outcome comparable to the issue
experienced is obtained. Physics models are complex and may not be deemed practical for a
fault isolation application alone. However, these models have become the norm for assisting
with the design of new complex systems. This means much of the computational effort may
already be accomplished and available for modification and integration into a fault isolation
environment.

22

NASA is developing a physics based model to simulate the launch pad’s liquid hydrogen
propellant ground system. They modify the nominal-run model by simulating faults. The sensor
data is collected and archived for use in fault diagnosis applications (Osipov et al., 2011). A
modeled-based diagnostic approach to the system is accomplished using a combined qualitativequantitative methodology approach per (Mosterman & Biswas, 1999). As the measured values
diverged from predicted values, these are compared to qualitative predictions made using the
system model for fault isolation. Fault identification is performed using particle filters for joint
state-parameter estimation (Daigle, Foygel, & Smelyanskiy, 2011).

Expert Systems
As expert systems are intended to mimic human-reasoning (the predominant method employed to
identify fault sources), they have been widely used for fault isolation applications. Expert systems
are developed using rules based on empirical associations. Fault diagnosis is a hierarchical process
carried out in a step-by-step manner with the next step dependent on the results from the previous
one (Kodavade, 2012). An expert will reason via a set of rules that leads to a logical chain of
events. A fault is detected if a violation of these rules occurs (Marzat, Piet-Lahanier, Damongeot,
& Walter, 2012). Table 1 - Expert System Techniques for Fault Detection/Diagnosis (Angeli,
2010) provides a summary of the pros/cons to the different types of expert systems.
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Table 1 - Expert System Techniques for Fault Detection/Diagnosis (Angeli, 2010)
ADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGES
Rule based diagnostic expert systems
Rules can be added or removed easily
Lack of generality
Explanation of the reasoning process
Poor handling of novel situations
Inability to represent time-varying and spatially
Induction and Deduction process is easy
varying phenomena
A process model is not required
Inability to learn from their errors
Difficulties in acquiring knowledge from experts
Efficiency and effectiveness in fault detection
reliably
Development and maintenance is costly
Model based diagnostic expert systems
Device independent diagnosis
Domain dependent
Knowledge acquisition is not needed
Difficulties in isolation of faults
Ability of diagnosing incipient faults
Knowledgebases very demanding
Deal with unexpected cases
Flexibility in the cases of design changes
Dynamic fault detection
On-line diagnostic expert systems
Real time fault diagnosis
Domain dependent
Ability to handle noise
Good models are required
Generalization
Require considerable data
Fast computation
Inability to explain the reasoning process
Ability to handle with dynamics
Computationally expensive

NASA has developed a rule-based expert system called Spacecraft Health Inference Engine
(SHINE) to perform system health diagnostic functions. SHINE uses heuristics to quickly
isolate possible fault causes and causal-reasoning to analyze the fault and further refine possible
causes (Straub, 2011). This system has been used for ground testing of the ARES 1X rocket (M.
A. Schwabacher et al., 2010a) and the Tactical Satellite-3 (TacSat-3) spacecraft (Mackey,
Brownston, Castle, & Sweet, 2010).
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Functional Fault Model
A functional fault model (FFM) is a term being applied to an application that maps out the
system in a way that links the inputs/outputs down to specific components. A commercial
product being used in several space operation systems is called TEAMS (“Qualtech Systems »
TEAMS-Designer,” n.d.). An FFM will identify the Failure Effect Propagation Paths (FEPP)
from a failure mode back to the sensor that detected the anomaly. It then uses the archived maps
to identify the potential failure sources or modes that are consistent with the system response to
the anomaly (Ferrell, Lewis, Perotti, Oostdyk, & Brown, 2010).

Anomaly Detection and Fault Isolation
This paper has reviewed the topics of anomaly detection and fault isolation separately as
approaches to developing the corresponding models differ substantially. This is further
necessitated as the forthcoming architectural framework will have to treat the models
independently. It should be noted that the academic literature often combines these two areas of
study into a single topic. There is compelling rationale to take this approach as both detection
and isolation must occur before corrective action(s) take place. This complexity of complex
models is the driving force behind the need for an architectural framework that can integrate
many ‘modules’ that will comprise fault detection and isolation schemes.

System Engineering Tools
This research effort is focused on building a framework that enables the current anomaly
detection and fault isolation technologies. Such a framework must be capable of integrating a
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multitude of potential models to meet user requirements (many still in development). In
addition, it shall be readily adaptable so that it can be ‘custom-fitted’ to meet specific mission
requirements for the various operations it is envisioned to support. With an assortment of
models and algorithms available (each with its own unique specialty) and the numerous
requirements anticipated, a systems engineering approach is deemed the best method to manage
the complex architecture development. After an initial survey of the available tools, System
Modeling Language (SysML) is the application selected to support this research effort
(“OMGSysML-v1.3-12-06-02.pdf,” n.d.). A complete specification of SysML can be found in
(Friedenthal, Moore, & Steiner, 2012a).

Model-based systems engineering supports analysis, specification, design, and verification of the
system by organizing activities through formalized representations of the system referred to as
models. This methodology enhances the quality of the design process, supports reuse of the
various output components and augments the identification of system impacts should subsequent
design changes be considered (Friedenthal, Moore, & Steiner, 2012b) (Cressent, David, Idasiak,
& Kratz, 2010).

SysML is a derivative of the Unified Modeling Language (UML). UML has become a very
popular tool used to develop large-scale, complex software applications across multiple
platforms. As UML is software-centric, SysML was developed to apply the successful UML
techniques to the system engineering field in all areas (not just software engineering). To
support an application base that includes both hardware (mechanical, fluids, electrical) and
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software applications, SysML reuses and extends a subset of UML 2.1 constructs (Johnson,
Kerzhner, Paredis, & Burkhart, 2012, para. 1.1):
•

Extends UML classes into blocks

•

Enables requirements modeling

•

Supports parametric modeling

•

Extends UML dependencies into allocations

•

Reuses and modifies UML activities

•

Extends UML standard ports into flow ports

Utilizing the SysML language, models can be produced that are capable of describing the system
in detail. Disciplinary engineers use analytical tools to accomplish design and analysis tasks. If
there are times when a study (cost, risk, tradeoff, etc.) requires both system and analytical
information, this must be manually obtained from each application. There are system
engineering tools that bridge this gap and integrate the corresponding information and
subsequent updates (Kim, Fried, Menegay, Soremekun, & Oster, 2013). This points out that a
single system engineering tool may not be sufficient to achieve research goals, and SysML may
have to be augmented with a compliment of supporting tools.

The European Space Agency (ESA) has a facility called the Concurrent Design Facility (CDF)
that is a state-of-the-art program in the field of concurrent engineering and system engineering
research. The CDF is used to perform feasibility studies for potential future space missions.
They currently build system engineering models using Excel, and decided to test a model-based
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system engineering approach using SysML. The MBSE model was considered applicable to the
concurrent engineering approach. They selected a case study on a project called Near Earth
Exploration Minimum System. The results of their testing are mixed with complaints about the
significant amount of time to build the model with too little added value. However, their final
conclusion was that SysML modeling should be paired to work in conjunction with their current
integrated design model as they see potential in this tool as the technology matures (de Lange,
Guo, & de Koning, 2012).

There is a French program developing a ramjet powered vehicle capable of reaching speeds
between Mach 4 and 8 (called LEA). A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was
performed on the components that make up the vehicle. They input the FMEA results into
SysML identifying all the blocks and parts and establishing the hierarchy between these items.
Then they mapped each component using ports and connectors. With several system
architectures to choose from, the resulting model allowed the final decision to include the failure
mode of the system (Cressent et al., 2010). In fault isolation modeling, a FMEA is routinely the
first document assessed as much of the work in identifying the failure modes and components
involved is complete. SysML’s diagraming tools allow for suitable characterization of these
failures and this technique could be adapted to developing a fault isolation model.

Recognizing the trend in model-based system engineering (MBSE), NASA's Langley Research
Center initiated a project to test this technique. They implemented a pilot program to evaluate
MBSE methodology and centered it on the early phase of the Materials International Space
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Station Experiment-X (MISSE-X). MISSE-X is designed to be installed on the exterior of the
international space station in which experiments reside that “advance the technology readiness of
materials and devices necessary for future space exploration.” The goal was to develop a SysML
model that could capture requirements, behavior, architecture and operating environment of the
experiment. The results of the pilot program showed that the investment of effort in MBSE is
substantial, but one that produced noteworthy returns (Vipavetz, Murphy, & Infeld, 2012).

Gap Analysis
A gap analysis on the reviewed literature is essential to determine if a research gap exists, thus
identifying an area for which additional study is appropriate. The review was structured such that
the literature cited would best support the research topic. However, since the goal is to find a
research area that may benefit from additional study, a lack of conclusive references specific to
the topic should be expected. To determine if the documents reviewed are supportive to this
research effort, certain questions are asked to include:
•

Anomaly Detection/Fault Isolation
o What is the scope of existing anomaly detection and fault isolation
applications?
o Are they specific to an application or more general and used universally?
o Can anomaly detection techniques be used for fault isolation (and viceversa)?
o Are multiple anomaly detection/fault isolation models presented?
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Are the models specific to anomaly detection or fault isolation, or

are they cross functional?


Are these models integrated so that they work collectively?

o Is there an architecture defined for the model (or multiple models)?
•

System Engineering Tools
o Which methods/tools are used for framework development?
o Are there existing applications supporting space operations?
o Are there existing applications focused on anomaly detection and/or fault
isolation?
o

Is there a conceptual detector and/or isolator framework already in-place?

The literature review concentrated on three areas to include anomaly detection, fault isolation
and system engineering tools from which to build a model. During the review, it was found that
the majority of the anomaly detectors and fault isolators were “specialists.” These techniques
often had narrow design functions targeting specific technologies. Even the data driven
applications, those that are effective without insight into the physics behind the system, have to
be fine-tuned to recognize system operational nuances. As this research effort is intended to be
applicable to complex systems, the use of multiple anomaly detectors and/or fault isolators is
anticipated to be the norm. Therefore, it is important that any resulting framework must be able
to integrate multiple and diverse applications.

The gap analysis commenced by identifying the characteristics that support development of a
standardized framework for designing anomaly detection/fault isolation systems. The research
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literature was then reviewed and documents that met the selected characteristics were identified.
These characteristics were divided into three separate categories. The first category simply
identified the documents as being related to either anomaly detection, fault isolation or research
that supports framework development, thus matching the three focus areas mentioned above.
Referenced literature that did not meet one of these characteristics was excluded from the gap
analysis.

It was not unusual to find research that included both anomaly detection and fault isolation as
these topics are often combined to meet industrial needs. However, it should be noted that
literature involving anomaly detection or fault isolation did not include framework development
methods for selecting these types of applications. Nor did any of the framework development
literature reviewed involve applications specific to anomaly detection or fault isolation content.

The next category centered on the anomaly detection and fault isolation literature. These
characteristics first included the class of technology that these detectors/isolators fit as outlined
earlier in this literature review (reference table 2). This classification allowed for identifying
common techniques between the anomaly detection and fault isolation applications. Another
characteristic within this group then keyed on whether these works pertained to multiple models,
and if so, did the research integrate these models together. This is considered important as the
eventual detection/isolation system developed will likely be comprised of multiple models. The
last characteristic in this category highlighted any of the works that included an architecture
depicting the models.
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The third category addresses the system engineering practices for generating a framework that
standardizes anomaly detection and fault isolation system development. The first characteristic
within this category refers to whether the literature includes SysML and/or MBSE techniques for
system development. Next it identifies those works where SysML/MBSE has been applied to
anomaly detection or fault isolation applications. Finally, it determines if architectural
development is already occurred these areas. Reference Table 2 - Gap Analysis Summary for a
summary of the gap analysis results.
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Table 2 - Gap Analysis Summary
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Gap Analysis Observations
The various characteristics have been identified from the literature reviewed and this information
has been consolidated in table 3. Inspection of this table shows that ‘gaps’ do appear to exist in
relation to the research topic. The following observations summarize areas in which conclusive
research is absent:
•

The literature involving anomaly detection/fault isolation (AD/FI) did not include

an architecture as to how these applications should be selected and used. Those works
that had the ‘architecture defined’ feature selected (Kodavade & Apte, Schwabacher, et
al.) only had an upper-level depiction of the architecture specific to the model(s) being
presented.
•

The SysML/MBSE references did present several instances of applications related

to space operations processing. However, none presented methods for developing a
framework specific to AD/FI applications.
•

There was little research encountered related to integrating multiple models.

Much of the AD/FI literature was specific to a single application. Several surveys
described multiple models (Abdul-Aziz, et al., Chandola, et al., Gogoi, et al. and Omar, et
al.) but these works did not attempt to integrate the models exhibited. Park provides an
overview of an integrated anomaly detection scheme called ‘BEAM,’ but the emphasis of
the article is on a single module within this system (Park et al., 2002). Russell and
Schwabacher both present integrated AD/FI systems (with mixed results), but each uses
an unique framework (Russell et al., 2011) (M. A. Schwabacher et al., 2010b). None of
the literature reviewed provides the methodology for AD/FI application selection.
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Literature Review Summary
A survey of the literature was performed on the topics of anomaly detection and fault isolation,
as well as system engineering tools that could be used to develop a detection/isolation
framework. Numerous models are available in both model-based and data-driven classes. The
algorithms involved tend to be ‘specialists’ in that they are most effective for selective failure
modes and/or component types. Therefore, it is anticipated that a detector/isolator system will be
comprised of multiple applications so that it is effective on the complex system for which it is
being designed

The primary method of anomaly detection is an exception-based method. This method notifies
an operator if design or operational limits are exceeded. Data-driven models have found a role in
complex, dynamical systems, and function by detecting outliers in the data which have not yet
exceeded predetermined limits. Such models can disregard the physics behind the system
allowing for distribution across multiple systems, though detection accuracy is dependent on the
quality of training data and effectiveness of the scoring-algorithm. Fault isolation techniques
tend to be model-based as system knowledge is required to isolate the fault to its source.
Isolation is a difficult task as systems often lack the requisite sensor data, hence lacking the
necessary insight for accurate identification. This difficulty is further compounded by large
numbers of potential sources to evaluate within complex systems.

An architectural framework that combines these methods is desirable. A model based system
engineering tool, SysML, shall be used to evaluate the premise that such a framework is possible.
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A descriptive model that can assist with analysis, specification, design and verification of this
concept is the desired outcome.

A gap analysis was performed on the literature reviewed. The analysis shows that a gap exists in
the methodology for selecting anomaly detection and fault isolation applications. In addition, the
review was unable to uncover a systematic approach for a selection process using model-based
system engineering techniques. This dissertation will pursue this line of research.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter depicts the methodology used in this dissertation. It provides a road map towards
developing a framework that can standardize the selection of anomaly detection and fault
isolation applications that can best be integrated into a desired system. This design addresses the
research gap identified and provides a process by which the research objectives can be realized.

Methodology
This research topic originated from an observation that anomaly detection and fault isolation
applications were selected based more on availability than on ability to meet system needs.
Initial research was unable to uncover a practice that could assist a user with this selection
process. In addition, this preliminary research determined that a significant amount of research
has been generated related to anomaly detection and fault isolation techniques. Much of this
research has not been applied in commercial applications. This led to the Problem Statement
described in Chapter 1.

A framework that standardizes this selection process using system engineering principles is the
goal of this research. Such a model must be able to pair numerous and unique detection/isolation
techniques to a variety of applications in a way that maximizes efficiency of the integrated
system. Figure 3 - Research Methodology Diagram illustrates how this study will go forward to
meet this objective.
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Problem Statement
The research process starts by first identifying a ‘problem,’ or an area that could benefit from
additional academic-level research. In this case, the focus is on anomaly detection and fault
isolation applications that could be used in space operation systems. Little research could be
found on existing architectural templates that could integrate these applications into the
designated systems. More specifically, there is an absence of a methodological process for
generating anomaly detection and fault isolation designs to either embed within new system
concepts, or supplement existing schemes.

Research Objectives
The next step is to generate objectives that will work towards resolving the problem area
identified. Achieving these objectives is the goal of this study (and meeting this goal signals that
the dissertation research effort is complete). The objectives for this research include:
•

Develop a framework that standardizes how users can augment a system with

detection/isolation capabilities
o

Framework to use system engineering principles

o

System can be either existing or a new design

o

Framework to provide a means to rank or optimize detectors and

isolators under consideration
•

Validate the model by experimentation using actual space operation systems data
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Literature Review
A comprehensive literature review is performed to survey relevant works that may exist
addressing the problem identified. A thorough review aids in bounding the research problem and
directing the path forward. A literature review expands insight into the chosen topic, and allows
for assessing related prevailing concepts. More specifically, the review includes discovering the
various detection/isolation methodologies already developed and understanding the variables that
make up the different technologies. These applications have been categorized into class-objects
as this organization will assist with model development. Insight is also gained by identifying
relationships among the system applications for which these detectors/isolators are designed to
support.

Gap Analysis
After a literature review is complete and the effort summarized, a gap analysis is performed to
determine where existing research efforts are lacking. Research gaps in the designated field are
an indication that those areas could benefit from additional study. In this case, conclusive
references specific to system engineering techniques that support development of a
detector/isolator framework were not discovered, thus signifying that this topic is deserving of
further pursuit.

Synthesis
Identifying all the pertinent data is the first step in generating a framework. When an anomaly
occurs, it is expected to ‘disrupt’ the sensor array thus signaling an operator that the system is
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diverging from nominal. A domain expert (or an algorithm) must then ‘interpret’ the deviations
observed from the instrumentation, and using a logical process of elimination, isolate the
problem to a specific subsystem or component fault. At this point, remedial action (if required)
can be considered. Therefore, an important relationship exists between the type of anomalies
that can occur and the availability/arrangement of sensors used to monitor the system. These are
the primary dataset sources that will support this research.

Failure Identification
As the goal of this research is the enhancement of anomaly detection and fault isolation
capabilities of complex systems, the potential failures that can occur must be quantified to
encompass all that can operationally impair the system. If a ‘Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis’ (FMEA) has been accomplished on the system, then potential faults may have already
been identified. Fault-tree analysis is a technique that can be used to scope the potential failures
for a component or system. Each of the fault-tree’s basic or intermediate events denotes a failure
that can impact the functionality of the top-level item indicated.

Not all failures will impact system performance. For example, a cabinet that houses system
instrumentation inside a conditioned room with a broken latch may be considered a benign
failure. The same broken-latch cabinet mounted outside may have more ominous consequences
while operating during inclement weather. Therefore, failure criticality must be taken into
consideration when determining those problems that require inclusion. In addition, some
potential problems may have an extremely low probability of occurring. A pipe support tends to
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be a static structure designed to carry more than its prescribed load. This precludes having to
instrument each and every pipe support even though a support failure could result in damage to a
crucial pipe run. A risk analysis (criticality vs. probability) can be used to maintain the list of
potential failures at a manageable level and remain focused on credible issues that threaten
system performance.

As the path forward in developing this framework is guided by a systems engineering approach,
defining requirements will be an essential element to this process. The inventory of failures
generated by this analysis will lead to a corresponding requirement that states the failure mode
shall be detected.

System Monitoring
The principal limitation in the ability to fully detect/isolate anomalies can be directly correlated
to the system instrumentation. Instrumentation must be embedded within the remote hardware it
is evaluating, and communicate via a C&C subsystem to provide operator feedback. This is
costly and makes it impractical to include a sensor for every possible failure mode. These
indicators too are susceptible to failure which results in some system degradation (for nonredundant sensors) as a reduction in visibility occurs. The first question routinely asked when a
measurement alarms is, “Did the sensor fail?” In addition, unwanted actions may occur as
automated processes may be invoked that are linked to (failed) instrument data.
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For remote systems, the operator’s ‘view’ is restricted to what the sensor array provides. The
instrumentation encompassed within a design will have a specific purpose for its inclusion.
Typically, it will meet operational requirements for monitoring the system functionality in
general, as well as supporting various tasks. These operational requirements will bound the
measurement to a tolerance range, and induce an alarm should the tolerance be exceeded. This is
where the various anomaly detection techniques come into play. They are not limited to
monitoring a specific measurement for a specific operational band. Instead, they look at the
system or subsystems as a whole and extrapolate information from multiple sensors. This
method uses both direct and indirect measurements to infer system health.

Using, for example, a valve that fails to indicate closed after being commanded to that state. The
fact that the close switch never went on was a direct indication of that valve’s state. However,
this one indicator should not be taken at face value, but treated only as an alarm that something is
amiss. A fault tree may show numerous faults that can lead to a valve malfunctioning. In
addition to the closed indicator remaining OFF, Table 3 - Valve Fault Scenarios, describes sensor
feedback that will assist in determining the valve’s current position. For all three possible states,
multiple sensors must be evaluated to corroborate that position. This process is anomaly
detection. It is not limited to simply fielding an alarm, but using this alarm combined with other
indications (both anomalous and nominal) to determine the system’s current state.
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Table 3 - Valve Fault Scenarios
Valve Position

Open

Partially
Open/Closed
Closed

Sensor Feedback
Close Limit Switch Remained OFF (anomalous)
Open Limit Switch Remained ON (anomalous)
No changes to immediate upstream/downstream pressures or
temperatures (anomalous)
Close Limit Switch Remained OFF (anomalous)
Open limit switch goes OFF (valve moved) (nominal)
Downstream pressure drops some, but not fully (anomalous)
Close Limit Switch Remained OFF (anomalous)
Open limit switch goes OFF (valve moved) (nominal)
Downstream pressure drops completely (nominal)

Fault isolation is the process of using the sensor array to pinpoint the source of the fault to a
specific component (or base-event on a fault tree). This too is important as it assists in
determining the extent of the anomaly’s impact. If the example valve did in fact close, this
would imply the close limit switch failed per the fault scenarios above (reference Table 3 - Valve
Fault Scenarios). However, if the failure was due to a failed discrete processing card in the C&C
subsystem, then it may have other implications as these cards typically contain multiple
indicators. This requires that all measurements that can provide any insight into an anomaly be
identified for that anomalous condition.

Datasets
Several datasets have been identified to support this research project. First, all potential
anomalies must be identified. This will be accomplished using fault-tree analysis at the
component level. A risk analysis will limit the collection of faults by ruling out those deemed
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non-credible based on probability and criticality of the failure. Next, all system sensors must be
described. These will be cataloged to the type of failure they can detect and subsystem they
support.

A matrix can be generated that combines these datasets and relates this information at a
component level. For each fault, any indicators that can provide awareness to that component
and supporting subsystems will be listed. In addition, when multiple measurements are required
to make a judgment, the matrix must be able to distinguish those sensors that must collaborate
with others to make a failure determination.

The Space Shuttle program’s Problem Reporting and Compliance Application (PRACA)
repository contains all non-conformances reported for both the LH2 and LO2 systems. This will
be a valuable source of actual issues that can support both model testing and validation.
Synthetic problems may also need to be generated to account for credible problems not
encountered during critical Shuttle operations.

Preliminary Framework Development
This section focuses on developing a preliminary framework. This framework begins with the
data synthesis just described. In keeping with a systems engineering approach in this research
effort, a Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) application will be employed for framework
development. This application will meet SysML language standards. SysML is derived from
UML in that it has been extended to support both hardware and software development. An
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MBSE model has several advantages that support this effort. First, the ability to make changes
and analyze the subsequent impact will be beneficial when it comes time to fit the various
detectors/isolators onto the designated system. Next, the capability to reuse objects created can
reduce the overall effort, a process that can be quite tedious for a complex system. A SysML
modeling tool enforces the language rules and also provides means for tracking requirements and
validating the model which are important features for this project.

With a modeling approach selected, initial framework development involves examination of the
detection/isolation techniques and a means to organize these applications by variables that
support the framework design. These applications will be aligned into classes (and sub-classes)
consistent with the groupings outlined within the literature review. Each anomaly detection and
fault isolation class will be labeled by both their capabilities and interface. The capabilities (or
behaviors) will be used to determine which requirements they can satisfy, and the interface will
identify the inputs/outputs for that application. This preliminary framework will result in
detection/isolation ‘modules’ that are ready for system inclusion in a model-based environment.

Case Study
A space-operations related case study will be presented that showcases the implementation of the
proposed framework. In this case, a system to augment with a detector/isolator application is
necessary. To meet this need, the cryogenic liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LO2)
systems at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have been selected. These systems, located at the
launch pad, were used to fill the Space Shuttle’s external tank with propellant and oxidizer for
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the Shuttle’s three main engines (and are slated for use again with the next NASA Space Launch
System (SLS) program). Due to the hazardous aspects of these operations, the pad systems are
operated remotely in a control room located approximately three miles away. In addition, the
cryogenic properties of the propellant dictates that loading the Shuttle occurred within hours of
launch leaving little time to resolve issues that arise in narrow launch windows. These timecritical and high-risk operations makes the designated systems good candidates to be ‘outfitted’
with anomaly detection and fault isolation enhancements.

This case study involves taking the LH2 system initially and replicating it in an MBSE format.
A unique approach is planned that models the system not only as it operates nominally, but as a
system of ‘failures.’ This involves capturing the component states at a given failure mode and
modeling the subsequent actions (behavior) as an impact to the sensor array. It is envisioned that
this method will better enable the detector/isolator selection process. Being able to match the
application capabilities directly to failure modes they are designed to detect should facilitate the
application-system pairing process.

This initial modeling includes identifying those components and assemblies in which
detection/isolation attributes are desired as these will evolve into requirements. At this point, the
anomaly detection and fault isolation modules will be integrated into the model. The goal here is
to ensure all potential fault sources are covered and corresponding system requirements are being
satisfied. Legacy LH2 system problem data will be available for ingestion into the model while
developing and testing this case study.
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Evaluation
This section centers on the analysis of the case study results. This includes verifying the
progressing design to include confirmation that requirements are fulfilled and all system
interfaces are identified. During evaluation, a methodology will be developed that optimizes the
component selection. By optimal, it will assume a design that meets requirements while
lessening complexity, and subsequently, the aggregate cost for design, implementation and
procurement. This will be accomplished by minimizing the number of detection/isolator
applications and enabling data sharing via common interfaces. The advantage to an MBSE
approach is the capability to insert/remove various components (from both system and/or
detector/isolator applications) and assess the overall impact on the design. This is expected to
ease process development. Finally, the resultant data will be interpreted, synthesized, and all
findings uncovered shall be reported.

Framework
Testing via the system (and problem data) provided from the case study, evaluation of the results
and framework development is expected to be an iterative process. This task will focus on
capturing this process and will ultimately define the framework. The initial phase will
continuously modify the model until a (sufficiently) functional framework emerges. This will be
followed by fine-tuning the framework to achieve some optimizing characteristics for the
selection process.
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Once the resultant framework is specified, it will be validated. This will be accomplished by
using the framework to augment the LO2 system with anomaly detection and fault isolation
capabilities. Both real system faults (legacy) and synthetic problems will be used to test the
model. This section concludes when a framework can be validated that ideally meets the
research objectives.

Conclusion
The conclusion will summarize the research to include analysis, interpretations, findings, results
and concluding remarks. This will also comprise the various accomplishments and their relation
to the research objectives. Recommendations will be suggested for future work from either
related questions raised during the study in areas that may benefit from closer examination, or for
the next logical path in further developing a standard that integrates anomaly detection and fault
isolation technologies.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK
This chapter proposes a preliminary framework that forms the foundation from which this
research effort is based. This framework will describe the principles and procedures used to pair
anomaly detection and fault isolation (AD/FI) applications to new or existing complex systems.
This framework involves a multi-stage process as outlined below:
• Ascertain and scope the system to be augmented
• Identify and categorize the sensor data available for ingest
• Identify and categorize the potential system faults
• Identify and categorize the possible AD/FI applications for consideration
• Model the system
• Model the AD/FI techniques
• Perform MBSE-centered ‘trade studies’ of the various AD/FI techniques
o

Evaluate/analyze those tested

• Make recommendation(s)

Some of these processes may work in parallel while others have distinct predecessors and/or
successors. Reference Figure 4 - Preliminary Framework Process Flow for a process flow
diagram of the initial framework.
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Figure 4 - Preliminary Framework Process Flow

System Scope
The first step is to define the system to be enhanced with AD/FI capabilities and determine the
scope to which detection is required. This scope not only includes the breath or boundaries of
the system, it is also comprised of the level of granularity to which detection abilities are
applicable. These boundaries should encompass the system itself, the sensors that provide
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feedback to the operators and the command-and-control subsystems (both reception and transmit
locales).

The level of detail at which the detection capabilities must function must also be defined. This
detail level will be dependent on the system design combined with requirements derived from the
stakeholders. Typically, this detail will go to the component level at which a specific element is
replaced. However, when the system includes redundant subassemblies or process legs, then
detection may be required only for this level as the secondary assembly/process may be brought
online should the primary subsystem fail.

Scoping the system should also identify AD/FI capabilities that already exist within the system.
This can avoid unnecessary overlap in cases where existing techniques are robust. It may also
identify cases where additional enhancement is required for capabilities that may be
underprovided.

Sensor Array
The sensors are the principal means of providing visibility into the health and status of a remote
operated system for those monitoring its performance. This is also the limiting factor in the
ability to determine if an anomaly is occurring and what is the root cause for that problem. The
sensors are designed into the system in positions that communicate key information for specific
operational scenarios. For complex systems, it may take many such measurements to provide an
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adequate status. Often, system health and status is inferred from a combination of indicators, and
not necessarily as that specific measurement were originally intended to be used.

As the sensor array provides the view of the system, it is very important to identify all the
sensors available within the system. These indicators will determine the detail level scope at
which the system will be modeled. There is no need to provide high granularity detail if the
sensor array does not provide high resolution visibility. Once the sensors are identified, they
must then be categorized based on the type of data they provide. This will include both direct
and indirect information that can be gathered from these indicators. This is a key step. Many of
the AD/FI techniques are based on their ability to garner bits of information from multiple
sensors and provide an accurate depiction of the system status.

Determine Potential Faults
All potential faults that can adversely impact system performance must be identified. The
resulting list will drive requirement development stating that the system shall have the capability
to detect such faults

This will initially be accomplished using a fault tree analysis approach.

Fault trees are a graphical method that model component failures and also show how such
failures can propagate through the system (Ruijters & Stoelinga, 2015). As the name implies,
this is a tree structure that identifies basic (circle) and intermediate (rectangle) events that could
possibly lead to the issue denoted in the top-level block. These events (or failures) follow a path
towards this top-level anomaly, and this path is controlled by AND or OR gates. Reference
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Figure 5 - Valve Component Fault Tree for a partially developed fault-tree representing a remote
operated valve).
Valve Not Indicating
Closed
(following issue of
close command)

Closed
Indicator Fails
(Sensor)

Valve Failed
(System)

Actuation System
Fails

Solenoid Valve
Fails

Actuation
Pressure is
Lost

Seat
Contamination
Prevents Full
Closure

Valve Binding
Prevent Full
Closure

Structural
Failure

Actuator
Structural
Failure

Fuse Blows

Remote Comm Lost
(Command &
Control)

Loss of Power

DC Power
Supply Fails

Control Card
Fails

Processor Fails

Facility Power
Loss

Figure 5 - Valve Component Fault Tree

A systematic approach should be applied to bind the number of potential faults. Initially, this
will encompasses all components at the operational level at which they are replaced should a
failure occur. However, there may be circumstances when it is not practical to provide detail all
the way down to the component level. This could include cases where the component is not that
critical and its loss will have minor, if any, impact on the system. In addition, there may be
redundant process legs that can be completely isolated from one another. The failure mode in
this scenario need only be identified to one of the redundant subassemblies. Finally, the system
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visibility provided by the sensor array will likely not cover 100% of the system components, thus
the system design forces a reduction in failure modes for inclusion.

Fault Reduction from Sensor Capability
The sensor array will be the primary factor in resolving the failure modes identified by the fault
tree to those in consideration for the framework. For those components that have some degree of
sensor oversight, criticality will be assumed (and assumed non-critical if sensor visibility is
lacking). If indicator granularity can only provide insight to a subassembly level, then the
corresponding failure mode will only be identified to this level.

A ‘Failures vs. Measurements’ table was produced using the fault-tree failures and a hypothetical
suite of corresponding measurements (reference Table 4 - Failures vs. Instrument Matrix). This
table uses a “D” to denote an indicator that directly monitors for a particular failure. Assuming
that sensor has not failed, then it is a sufficient data point to ascertain the corresponding failure
mode as the problem source. An “I” represents an indirect measurement. These cannot
exclusively determine the failure mode and require additional collaboration to reach a
conclusion.
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Table 4 - Failures vs. Instrument Matrix
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The above matrix (Table 4 - Failures vs. Instrument Matrix) can be used to further reduce the
number of failure modes. If a failure mode results in duplicate ‘mode vs. sensor’ allocation, then
these are candidates for merging into a single problem. In this case, the instrumentation may
detect a valve failure, but cannot distinguish between Seat Contamination, Valve Binding, Valve
Structural Failure or Actuator Structural Failure.

In the process of scaling down potential faults due to sensor limitations, it will not be unusual to
find gaps in the design that may allow critical processes to fail without detection. This can be
related to a design process that focuses on operational requirements. By performing an analysis
of the various fault modes, weaknesses in sensor types and distribution may be uncovered. This
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is a key point, and one that emphasizes the need to complete the arduous task of identifying the
majority of the potential faults. The task of selecting AD/FI should be biased heavily towards
anomalous conditions and less so towards nominal operations.

Anomaly Detection/Fault Isolation Applications
A review of the available AD/FI techniques should be performed to determine which
applications should be considered for system inclusion. This will be based on the requirements
generated that the application is expected to satisfy. It should not be assumed that a single
application will suffice. An ‘all-purpose’ algorithm may give up precision to accommodate a
broad detection capability while issue-specific methods may provide the needed accuracy, but
fulfill fewer requirements. Several factors may be used to prescreen which techniques will be
applicable for the given circumstance. These can include:
•

Budget
o

License costs to purchase an existing application


Setup costs to ‘customize’ the application for the given

system

•

o

Costs to develop a non-commercially available application

o

Maintenance and data gathering to support functionality

o

Hardware platforms/system integration

Effectiveness
o

Meets requirements

o

Specific functionality vs. general application
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o

Accuracy


Captures all (most) issues



Minimal ‘false’ alarms

The AD/FI applications will be addressed as classes that describe how their corresponding
techniques function. The framework will make a recommendation at this class level. Therefore,
it will be incumbent on the user to determine if commercial applications exist from which to
select the final product, or if development of a custom application is required. The following list
outlines the AD/FI classes that will be developed for this framework.
•

•

Anomaly Detectors
o

Rule Based

o

Nearest Neighbor

o

Clustering Algorithms

o

Neural Network

o

Statistical/Parametric

o

One-Class Support Vector Machines

Fault Isolators
o

Physics Model

o

Expert Systems

o

Fault Map Model
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Model the System
Using a model-based system engineering (MBSE) approach, the system will be modeled by
means of the system modeling language (SysML). SysML uses a complement of diagrams to
portray the system graphically for users and stakeholders. These diagrams provide a ’view’ of a
portion of that system. However, there is an underlying structure that connects the various
diagrams and interrelates with the model elements that are generated. The package diagrams
will be used to portray the structure of the model. When modeling the system, the following list
highlights fundamental elements that will be used to compose the model.
•

System Structure

•

System Behavior

•

Constraints

•

Requirements

•

Include Existing AD/FI Capabilities

The SysML diagrams are designed to support model development specific for this functionality.
These elements are explained in detail in the following sections.

System Structure
The system will be modeled by first focusing on the system structure. The SysML block
definition diagram (BDD) and internal block diagram (IBD) are used to define the system
structure. The fundamental element of structure in SysML is called a block which is used to
represent systems, subassemblies and components (among other abstractions). A BDD is used to
describe the structural schema of a system, and is composed of blocks that show their
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relationship with other blocks. A BDD was generated for a ‘remote operated valve’ assembly as
an example (reference Figure 6 - BDD for Remote Operated Valve Assembly). This BDD shows
that the Remote Operated Valve is composed of an Actuator, Valve and open/close Solenoid
Valves. The valve is also composed of 1 or 2 limit switches.
bdd [Package] Operational Domain Model [Remote Operated Valv e]

«block»
RemoteOperatedValv e
parts
:
:
:
:

Act

«block»
Actuator
flowProperties
inout 750_GN2

PriCloseSV
Actuator
PriOpenSV
Valve

Vlv

«block»
Valv e

OSV

«block»
PriOpenSV

CSV

«block»
PriCloseSV

parts
: LimitSwitches

LS 1..2
«block»
LimitSw itches

Figure 6 - BDD for Remote Operated Valve Assembly

An IBD is used to show the internal connections of the parts within a block. This is used when
there is a desire to add resolution to the composition of a block. An IBD was produced
(reference Figure 7 - IBD/Remote Operated Valve Assembly) that uses the parts that make up
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the Remote Operated Valve block (per figure 6). This diagram shows how the various parts
interface with one another. The parts include ‘ports’ that reveal some type of media is passed
between those parts. In this case, if the open and closed solenoid valves are energized, 750
pounds per square inch (PSIG) of gaseous nitrogen (GN2) is applied to the actuator’s open side
while the closed side is vented. This forces the actuator to move upward which opens the valve
(connected by valve stem).
ibd [Block] RemoteOperatedValv e [RemoteOperatedValv e]
«flowPort»
SV_Close

«flowSpecific...
Act_750GN2

: PriCloseSV
«flowPort» ActClose

«flowPort» PwrVDC

: Actuator

«flowPort» ActOpen

: PriOpenSV

«flowSpecific...
Pw r_28VDC

ValveStem

«flowPort»
SV_Open

«flowPort» PwrVDC
: Valve

Figure 7 - IBD/Remote Operated Valve Assembly

System Behavior
SysML also provides diagrams that depict system behavior to include Activity, Sequence, State
Machines and Use Cases. A use case diagram is simply used to show (typically) high level use
cases that the system may perform. A sequence diagram shows the interactions among the
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various system elements (or environment) based on ‘messages’ between these elements. These
two diagrams will be used in this framework to a lesser degree (if at all).

To model system behavior, this effort will concentrate on capturing that behavior using activity
and state machine diagrams. An activity diagram is used to portray behavior over time with an
emphasis on the flow of matter, energy and data among a set of actions (Delligatti, 2013). State
machines focus on event based behavior, and show how the system reacts to an event via state
changes of the model elements. These events are often asynchronous which is consistent with
anomaly occurrence within a system. State machine diagrams will be used to represent anomaly
events and the subsequent impact these events have on the system in the form of state changes.
This is a very important aspect of the modeling effort. Modeling the failure modes will enable
the ability to adapt model segments of the AD/FI applications to the system model, and
subsequently, the ability to test performance of those model sections.

Constraints
A parametric diagram is used to express constraints in the form of equations, expressions or rules
(Holt & Perry, 2013). This will provide support for analysis in the performance of the AD/FI
applications being tested. Violating a constraint is what signals the model that an anomalous
condition is occurring, thus constraints will be tied closely to the system sensors.
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Requirements
A requirements diagram is also provided by the SysML modeling language. As stated earlier,
requirements will be generated for those anomalies that the system shall require the capability to
detect. The requirements diagram is text based, though it allows one to link requirements to both
structural and behavioral model elements. This enhances the traceability between the
requirement, its implementation and satisfaction.

Existing AD/FI Capabilities
When modeling the system, it will be important to identify existing AD/FI capabilities embedded
within the system. This will minimize the duplication of capabilities when selecting from the
various applications, though some overlap will be expected. Often, these existing capabilities
will fall short of the desired detection level. Hence, the need to augment those capabilities with
additional coverage.

Model AD/FI Applications
Similar to modeling the system, the AD/FI applications too must be modeled. As previously
stated, a constraint violation will flag the system that an anomaly is occurring. Therefore, the
goal in modeling these techniques is to further bind the constraints which results in a higher
expectation that an exception will occur. These ’easier’ exceptions should correlate to a quicker
detection of a problem from a wider range of potential anomalies. This will be accomplished by
using the parametric diagrams to capture the application techniques, and then describing these
techniques in the terms of a system constraint.
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Trade Studies/Application Evaluations
Within the SysML literature, it is at times stated that an MBSE approach enables the ability to
perform trade studies. However, there is little written that formalizes this process. This is not
unusual as SysML does not dictate model methodology, it only specifies the language in the
form of rules. The actual model implementation is left to be formed by the user.

As part of the trade study, it is important to evaluate each of the alternatives and quantify the
value that application can add to the system. For a complex system, it is unlikely that a ‘onesize-fits–all’ application will suffice, thus several of the alternatives may be required. Analysis
will be required to rank the options. The goal will be maximizing the effectiveness while
minimizing the cost (assumed to correlate to the number of applications).

The Object Management Group (OMG), the organization that governs the SysML standard, has
recognized the necessity of trade studies. In the current specification for SysML 1.3, the OMG
includes an Annex for “non-normative extensions” that it may consider for inclusion into the
language in future versions. This Annex (D.3) describes the extension of a parametric diagram
to support trade studies and analysis. A trade study will be used to evaluate a set of alternative
AD/FI based on predefined criteria. An objective function can be used to represent the criteria
and determine the value of each alternative. A measure of effectiveness (MOE) will represent a
parameter with a value that is essential for determining the performance level of the alternative
applications (“OMGSysML-v1.3-12-06-02.pdf,” 2012).
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By extending the SysML language as outlined above, the process of performing the trade study
and evaluating the alternatives can be accomplished using an MBSE approach. This effort then
becomes embedded within the SysML model hierarchy, and subsequently, is available for recall
if system design artifacts are requested.

Make Recommendation(s)
Following the trade study, a list of recommendations should be produced. These
recommendations should be consistent with the analysis completed, however they should also
take into consideration the deficiencies that were observed during this process. For instance, not
all of the requirements may have been fully met with the available suite of candidate AD/FI
applications. This may drive a modification to the requirement or to the system itself. It may
also identify the need for a custom detector/isolator to meet the requirement. In addition, this
type of analysis will typically uncover inadequacies in the system design. This may highlight the
need for additional sensors to provide added feedback, or it may uncover critical components
without adequate redundancy. All such findings should be included in the recommendations.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY
This chapter will present a case study to describe the implementation of the anomaly detection
(AD) and fault isolation (FI) selection framework. As stated previously, the system under study
is the liquid hydrogen (LH2) system at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). This system is located
at the launch pads and was used to load both the Apollo and Space Shuttle launch vehicles. It is
currently going through a redesign process to support NASA’s next generation Space Launch
System (SLS) program.

The LH2 system provides the fuel for the launch vehicle’s oxygen/hydrogen engines. For
Shuttle, nearly 400,000 gallons of this fuel was loaded into the external tank (ET). Working with
LH2 poses many technical challenges. First, LH2 is a cryogenic fluid at -423 degrees
Fahrenheit. This extremely low temperature drives a system design that must be highly insulated
to minimize the commodity boil-off, and the hardware itself must be able to operate while
withstanding thermal cycles from ambient to cryogenic temperatures. As hydrogen is the
smallest molecule known, it is can prove difficult to keep leak-free within the system, a highly
desirable feature given that hydrogen is extremely flammable. Liquid hydrogen also poses risks
to personnel in that direct exposure will cause severe cryogenic burns, induces asphyxiation if
released in confined spaces and has a propensity to ignite and/or detonate if large quantities are
released in air.

These safety concerns, combined with the technical challenges, result in the cryogenic tank
loading operations being performed remotely with the Pad cleared of all personnel. The
66

astronauts and support crews do not enter the pad until the initial filling is complete. At this
point, only ‘replenish’ loading operations are underway to make up for boil-off losses (over 100
gallons per minute). To minimize the boil-off losses, loading operations commence as late as
possible resulting in a time-critical process. It is these operationally complex, highly hazardous
and time-critical characteristics that make this system an ideal candidate to augment with AD/FI
technology.

Framework Development
This case study will follow the proposed framework identified in Chapter 4 for initial system
model development (reference Figure 8 - Preliminary Framework Process Flow). As the course
of developing this case study model is anticipated to be an iterative process, this framework will
be improved and the implementing details refined as the model matures. The final framework
will be presented following analysis in the next chapter.
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Figure 8 - Preliminary Framework Process Flow

System Scope
The first step delineated in the proposed framework is to scope the system to be augmented with
enhanced AD/FI capabilities. This scope not only includes the breath or boundaries of the
system, it is also comprised of the level of granularity to which detection abilities are applicable.
These boundaries should encompass the system itself, the sensors that provide feedback to the
operators and the command-and-control subsystems (at both reception and transmit locales).
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The level of detail at which the detection capabilities must function need also be defined. This
detail level will be dependent on the system design combined with requirements derived from the
stakeholders. Typically, this detail will go to the component level at which a specific element is
replaced. However, when the system includes redundant subassemblies or process legs, then
detection may be required only for this level as the secondary assembly/process may be brought
online should the primary subsystem fail.

Scoping the system should also identify AD/FI capabilities that already exist within the system.
This can avoid unnecessary overlap in cases where existing techniques are robust. It may also
identify cases where additional enhancement is required for capabilities that may be
underprovided.

Liquid Hydrogen System
The LH2 system within the launch pads at KSC was used to fill the fuel portion of the space
shuttle’s external tank (ET) with nearly 400,000 gallons. The LH2 was used as the fuel for the
shuttle’s three main engines. This same system is planned to support the next generation Space
Launch System (SLS). Part of the system resides on the mobile launcher platform (MLP). The
shuttle vehicle is mounted on the MLP in the vehicle assembly building (VAB). The MLP then
rolls to the pad the LH2 lines are mated at the Pad/MLP interface to ‘complete’ the system. The
LH2 system hardware for both the pad and MLP are included in this scope. The LH2 is stored in
a vacuum jacketed storage tank with a total capacity of 900,000 gallons.
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There are three primary hardware subsystems built around this storage tank that enable the
transfer of LH2 to the flight vehicle. These include pressurization, transfer and vent systems. In
addition, a command and control system (C&C) is used to enable remote operations from a safe
distance. These subsystems are further detailed as follows.

Pressurization Subsystem
As LH2 is a very light liquid (0.591 lbs/gal), and the ET operates at lower pressures, the use of
pumps to flow the liquid is not necessary. Instead, the storage tank is pressurized to a nominal
pressure of 66 PSIG for initial higher-flow operations, and subsequently lowered as the flow rate
is decreased. The primary components that comprise this subsystem include a main and
auxiliary vaporizer (heat exchangers), a variable flow control valve (main) and control valves
(main & aux). The vaporizers are supplied LH2 from the tank separate from the cross-country
transfer lines. The vaporizer outlets return the gaseous hydrogen (GH2) to the top of the tank
(reference Figure 9 - LH2 Pressurization System). LH2 has an expansion ratio of 833:1, so
vaporization of a relatively small amount of liquid provides an adequate gas volume that is
compressed to pressurize the tank. As LH2 has a boiling point below -400 degrees Fahrenheit,
exposing the liquid to near ambient temperatures will force the evaporation necessary to generate
tank pressure.
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Figure 9 - LH2 Pressurization System

Transfer Subsystem
The transfer subsystem consists of piping that traverses the pad and MLP and connects to the
flight vehicle via an umbilical. This piping is dual-walled with a vacuum maintained between
the piping’s annular-space. These vacuum-jacketed lines provide the insulation necessary to
minimize the boil-off of the cryogen LH2.
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These cross-country transfer lines also include two valve control assemblies. One valve complex
is located at the base of the storage tank, and is comprised of several valves that allow both high
and low flow rates, as well as venting capability. The other valve complex is located on the ML
just upstream (when loading) of the vehicle umbilical. This valve assembly is used in
conjunction with the pad control system to provide various flow rates during vehicle loading, and
also supports drain operations should the launch get scrubbed for that day.

Vent Subsystem
As hydrogen is highly flammable, the GH2 is not allowed to be vented directly overboard from
the vehicle during loading operations. Instead, this vented gas is captured and routed to flare
stacks for safe disposal. There are four primary sources of vented GH2 as follows:
1.

The boil-off gas generated from the ET during fill operations.

2.

Within the flight vehicle, a small volume of LH2 is diverted to the engines

to provide thermal conditioning during the loading operations. The LH2/GH2
from this ‘bleed’ flow is captured by the vent system.
3.

The LH2 storage tank (following pressurization).

4.

Each section of the cross-country transfer lines that can be independently

isolated.
The vent system includes the isolation valves for all vent sources. The vehicle sources include
both vehicle and ground isolation valves (vehicle valves are out-of-scope for this case study).
The vent system also includes two flare stacks, and corresponding subsystems, that support
burning the exhaust GH2.
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Command and Control Subsystem
The C&C architecture is composed of computer servers (and supporting peripheral equipment)
within the control rooms that communicate with programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in the
vicinity of the hardware for which they control. The operators interface with their system via
keyboard and display(s). The PLCs located in the field directly energize/de-energize the
equipment based on the operator’s (or automated software) commanding. These PLCs also
provide instrumentation feedback for monitoring system performance.

As the operation and maintenance of C&C hardware requires a different skill set than those
performing launch vehicle loading operations, it is classified as a different subsystem from the
LH2 subsystem under study. Much of the C&C hardware has health and diagnostic functionality
built into the architecture, so there are limited opportunities to augment this with additional
value-added AD/FI technology. This health is monitored by that subsystem when the control
room is active. The C&C system also impacts multiple subsystems making it difficult to limit
the scope for this analysis. However, it is imperative that the operators know if they are dealing
with an issue related to their subsystem hardware as this directly influences the course of action
going forward. As the PLCs include numerous command or measurement cards (with less
‘health’ capability), the PLC control system will be included in this scope.

Existing AD/FI Capabilities
Scoping the system includes identifying the current AD/FI capabilities already employed. This
information is used to disqualify potential redundant AD applications from consideration, or
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select AD technologies intended to enhance those existing capabilities. For the LH2 system
under review, the primary method of anomaly detection is to bind tolerances to the
instrumentation. Should an exceedance occur on one of these sensors, an alarm is generated that
alerts the operators. This includes discrete measurements (i.e. position indicators or pressure
switches) in which case the alarm-state is set to the opposing nominal state. It also pertains to
analog measurements in which specific tolerances can be set both above and below a nominal
range. There are no fault isolation applications used within the LH2 system.

There are external AD provided by other subsystems that monitor LH2 operations. As stated
earlier, much of the C&C subsystem has health detection embedded within the architecture. Any
exceptions observed are annunciated over an audio communication network as the ability to field
an alarm on console may be suspect. There is also a Hazardous Gas Leak and Fire Detection
system. This subsystem monitors all vehicle and ground subsystems operating with hazardous
commodities.

Scope Overview
The LH2 system scope for this case study can be defined as follows:
•

Pressurization subsystem to the component level

•

Transfer subsystem to the component level

•

Vent subsystem to the component level

•

C&C subsystem to PLC end items only
o

Need ability to differentiate between system vs. C&C failure
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Existing AD/FI capabilities in which duplication is not desired include:
•

Alarm setting on system sensors

•

Health status for C&C processing components
o

Monitored by C&C subsystem

o

Limited health status for C&C end-item components (directly

interfaces with hardware)
•

Hazardous gas leak and fire detection
o

Monitored and operated by HGLFD subsystem

Identify and Categorize Fault Modes
To adequately apply AD/FI techniques on the given system, the potential faults that can have
detrimental consequences will need to be identified. There is an assortment of methods available
to include Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and its extension Failure Mode, Effects,
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Design Review by Failure Mode (DRBFM), Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) and its extension Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Hazard & Operability Studies
(HAZOP), Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) among others. The most
predominant techniques used in industry are FMEA and FTA (Cristea & Constantinescu, 2017).

Fault Tree Analysis
Fault tree analysis will be used to identify potential faults for this case study. Fault trees (FTs)
offer a graphical breakdown with regard to the hierarchy of failure modes. The base of the tree is
called the top event and the leaves are called basic events (Adler et al., 2011). Fault trees use a
75

top-down methodology that depicts, via a graphical representation, of how an anomaly can
propagate through the system. It is this propagation that may stimulate the AD/FI techniques
employed to detect system anomalies when direct signals may not be available/adequate to alert
the users, hence the selection of FTA.

Fault Tree Development
For complex systems, fault analysis is often accomplished in parallel during the design’s
development phase. This aids the designers with identifying critical areas that may require
fortification, redundancy and/or additional instrumentation for visibility. For added efficiency, a
system engineering best-practice would then be to leverage off existing analysis. To facilitate
this process, such analysis would optimally be embedded within the SysML model. The
following depicts a method to auto-generate FTs based on the SysML model generated (Clark,
Rabelo, & Yazici, 2017)

SysML uses diagrams to portray the system. The system’s structure is represented by Block
Definition Diagrams (BDDs) which are intended to describe the hierarchy of the structural
elements, or blocks. A block can represent a single component or an entire system. Structure is
further defined by Internal Block Diagrams (IBDs) used to depict the how the elements within a
block are connected and the type of matter, energy or data that flows between them. The IBD
provides an alternate view that can show the ‘usages’ of these blocks. Specifically, how the parts
are connected (and the flow that occurs between these parts) that involve the portion of the
system within the IBD view. For instance, a valve can be configured to an open or closed
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position. For a closed valve, both internal and external leakage may be a concern. For a valve
that is open for critical operations, internal leakage would not be a concern. This detail is
depicted with IBD views, so concentrating on these diagrams should result in fault associations
based on the component functions applicable to that subsystem. This combination of
connectivity and flow can illustrate how a failure is distributed through a system. Thus, it is
conducive to providing the necessary information in developing an FT.

The development of FTs for a complex system is not a trivial task. Many of the commercial FT
software packages will support import sheets with component data (beneficial to those with
existing component lists within their design documentation). However, identification of the
relevant failure modes, linkage of components to applicable subsystems and assignment of the
appropriate ‘gate’ is a manual process. As most of a system’s individual components will likely
have multiple failure modes, the number of basic events generated can far exceed the number of
components. As with most largely manual efforts, the input may be prone to errors, and
omission of critical data likely to occur. Since FTs are a graphical representation of the system,
they are difficult to condense without undermining the readability advantage from which they are
based. Subsequently, traversing large FTs also presents a challenge and can hamper the reviews
intended to find/remove such errors.

The system design information embedded within an IBD (with minimal model augmentation) is
used to auto-generate FTs. The intent is to provide an initial FT that is all-inclusive of the
components contained within the design, and therefore, minimize the errors and omissions that
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may occur from manual generation. This also reduces the effort required by the safety
engineer(s) as it is easier to modify or prune an existing tree vs. generating one from scratch. It
should be noted that this method does not preclude the subject matter expert’s (SME)
involvement. SME reviews will still be required to identify unique failures, multi-failure modes,
system-level (non-component) and external failures.

SysML/FT Abstraction
As stated earlier, much of the FT development is a manual process. Although there are
commercial applications available that can assist with this process, the structure of an FT renders
it unique and with minimal commonality among the numerous design models supplementing
development. Subsequently, there is little overlap of information to be garnered in support of
generating FTs. The process for constructing an FT can be summarized as follows:
•

Identify a top event and corresponding intermediate events

•

Scope the system to include all components that can contribute to the failure of

these events
•

Generate ‘Failure Modes’ at the component level (basic events)

•

Link the events via Boolean gates to form the tree structure

Although a SysML IBD too lacks all the information needed to accomplish the process above,
much of it can be found embedded within the IBD’s design. The remaining gaps can be filled by
extending the SysML model. An IBD represents a predefined block and graphically shows how
the parts within that block interconnect (may include the flow of matter, energy or data among
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these parts). These blocks can characterize the entire system, the various subsystems, component
assemblies, components and even the component makeup if that is the level of detail desired by
the stakeholders. As is typical for most MBSE methods, the system is first defined at a highlevel. This broadly defined system is then decomposed into subsystems, an iterative process that
continues until the desired level of detail is achieved. Therefore, a developed SysML model will
contain IBDs that denote the system structure at all levels of the project.

The 1st step in FT auto-generation is identifying the top event, followed by the applicable
intermediate events. This is accomplished by simply using the IBD frame title as this should
accurately reflect the subsystem’s functionality (assuming modeling best-practices employed).

The next step is to scope the system to ensure all applicable components are included. As the
IBDs illustrate the system’s design structure, they also define the system scope. All parts within
the IBD that have failure modes identified will be included in the FT.

Creditable failure modes must be determined for each component within the IBD. These modes
will be used to identify the basic events for the FT. This is information that is not readily
available within a SysML project, and therefore must be added to the model. A block can be
used to define the various failure modes, though for large projects, the user may want to create a
specific stereotyped element to represent these modes. To create the failure modes for the initial
FT, first categorize the components into common classifications. For instance, an ‘indicator’
class may include pressure transducers, temperature transducers, flowmeters, etc. For each
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component class, list the generic failure modes that applicable to that class. Generic failure
modes for a valve-class may include:
•

Valve fails open

•

Valve fails closed

•

Valve position unknown

•

Valve leaks externally

•

Valve leaks internally

Note too that failure modes may be applicable to multiple component classes (i.e. ‘leaks
externally’). Generating component classes results in a much smaller subset of failure modes
compared to the overall component base. Subsequently, the SysML model updates to
accomplish this step are minimal, compared to embedding this information within all the
component blocks.

The last step for FT development is to link events via Boolean gates to form the tree’s structure.
Linkage is already established between the top level of the localized FT (IBD title) and the parts
contained within the IBD. However, a connection must be made between the components and
failure modes added to the model. This can be accomplished by allocating failure modes to their
corresponding component classes. SysML specifies the use of ‘allocations’ as a means of
crosscutting the model and linking (integrating) the various model elements. An allocation
simply reflects that if a change occurs to the ‘supplier’ side, a change may be needed on the
‘client’ side, thus it represents a dependency of the clients to their supplier (“OMGSysML-v1.4-
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15-06-03.pdf,” n.d.). Allocation also allows for easy selection/deselection of the generic failure
modes as not all will be applicable in every component instance.

A Boolean gate must also be inserted between each level of events. NASA’s Fault Tree
Handbook with Aerospace Applications defines a “state of component” failure as one that is
localized to a component (all other failures are deemed “state of system”) and that state-ofcomponent failures should always utilize OR gates (Stamatelatos et al., 2002). This simplifies
the gate selection between the components and the failure modes as all will be OR gates.
However, the gates between the localized top event (likely a subsystem event) and corresponding
component levels may utilize either an AND or an OR gate. For instance, both primary and
secondary valves (redundant flow path) must fail for the system to fail. This relationship is FT
modeled with an AND gate. This needs to be noted as that information is not readily embedded
within the IBD or within the failure modes added to the model. Therefore, it needs to be
addressed to maximize the integrity of the initial FT. The example that follows provides one
method to accomplish this before FT auto-generation takes place.

Example
This section will provide an example of FT auto-generation. It uses an IBD that depicts the
liquid hydrogen (LH2) storage tank pressurization subsystem (reference Figure 10 IBD/LH2StorTankPressSys. This system pressurizes an LH2 storage tank which enabled LH2
flow to the Space Shuttle’s external tank. The last bracketed term in the IBD frame is
‘LH2StorTankPressSys.’ This is the top-level (subsystem) event for this IBD, and will later be
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appended with “_Fails” as events should reflect the issue under analysis. All the parts within this
IBD will make up the subsequent intermediate levels.
ibd [block] LH2StorTankPressSys [LH2StorTankPressSys]

LH2Storage: TNK-LH2-1

«ValueType» GH2

: GH2

«ValueType» GH2
StorTankPress: IND«itemFlow»
Press-6

«itemFlow»
VapOutCheck:
VLV-Chk-8[1..2]

PneuToPneuCntrl:
CNTRL-Pneu-1

: LH2

«ValueType» GH2
«itemFlow»

Vaporizer: VAP-1[1..2]

«ValueType» Pressure
«itemFlow»

SigPressIN
MainVapFlow Cntrl:
VLV-Cntrl-1

MainVapSO: VLV-Pneu17

«ValueType» LH2
«itemFlow»

«ValueType» LH2
«itemFlow»
AuxVapCntrl: VLVPneu-18

«ValueType» LH2
«itemFlow»

Figure 10 - IBD/LH2StorTankPressSys

The 1st step in extending the SysML model is to add the generic failure modes. For this example,
failure modes have been produced for the component classes applicable to this IBD only. They
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have been created as blocks and added to a package titled ‘FailureModes’ where they can be
accessed from the model repository (reference Figure 11 - Model Repository Example).

Figure 11 - Model Repository Example

With inclusion of the failure modes, they can now be allocated to applicable components. The
parts within the system where initially generated as ‘blocks.’ However, these blocks can have
multiple instances within a system, and each of those instances may have different functions.
When an instance of a component block is used within an IBD, it is categorized as a part83

property. As the applicable failure modes may differ based on how that part is used, the failure
modes should be linked to the individual part properties. This can be done via SysML diagrams
and the corresponding tool’s drawing features (reference Figure 12 – ‘FailureMode’ to Part
BDD).
bdd [package] FaultTreeLinks [FailModeToProp_Vlv]
VLV_MainVapSO

(from
LH2StorTankPressSys)

«allocate»
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvFailsClosed

«allocate»
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvLeaksInt

«allocate»
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvFailsOpen

«allocate»
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvLeaksExt

«allocate»
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvFailsPartially

«allocate»
«block»
FailureModes::
VlvPosUnknown

Figure 12 – ‘FailureMode’ to Part BDD

If a stakeholder need for a diagram view of these allocations is not required, then it is
recommended that a Relationship Matrix be used. The SysML standard does promote the use of
matrices, but does not standardized their use. Therefore, the functionality of matrices can differ
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between the tools. A matrix enables easy selection/deselection for both individual and multiple
blocks, and it also captures the IBD structure that is used to generate the FT (reference Figure 13
- Relationship Matrix).

Figure 13 - Relationship Matrix

As noted earlier, the IBD does not readily signal which Boolean gate should be used at the
component level. This is typically determined by analysis (and SysML is accommodating with
inclusion of such data). However, using a matrix from which to build an FT does limit the
information that can be embedded. To diminish the need to make such modifications after the
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FT is generated, the following method was employed. Two ‘AND’ blocks were included in the
model repository for failure modes. These blocks are intended to associate any AND conditions
for the components within that IBD. It needs to be stated that this usage of blocks does not
enhance the SysML model (and the element descriptions should be annotated accordingly).
Lacking a standard that aligns SysML with FT generation, this simply provides a means to
transfer information for external use. The IBD contains ‘main’ and ‘auxiliary’ vaporizer control
valves. These should be reflected with an AND gate, and the Relationship matrix has been
annotated accordingly.

The tool used for this example (Sparx’s Enterprise Architect) has the capability to export a
relationship matrix in a ‘.csv’ format. The following steps outline the process for building an FT
from the matrix. For this example, the ‘.csv’ file was imported into Excel. A VBA macro was
written that performs the following steps to auto-generate the FT (OR and AND gates are shown
textually) (reference Figure 16 - Excel/VBA Generated Partial FT):
1)

Save the .csv file using the IBD name. Append “_Fails” to the file name and use

this as the top event.
a.
2)

Place an OR gate below this event

For the next level, add all the components that are not allocated in the matrix to an

AND block (target). Append each component name with “_Fails.”
a.

Connect these events to the OR gate from the top level.

b.

Place an OR gate below the component intermediate events.
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3)

If applicable: For those components intended for AND gates (target), create a

new intermediate event (remains at the same level as the component OR gates). Event
title to be composed of component names, and appended with ‘_Fail.’
a.

Connect the events to the OR gate from the top level.

b.

Place an AND gate below these component events.

c.

Add a new level for those components linked to AND gates. Append each

component name with “_Fails.”

4)

i.

Connect these events to the corresponding AND gate(s).

ii.

Place an OR gate below these component events.

For all component events, add a new lower level with the corresponding failure

modes (source).
a.

Connect these events to the OR gates at the inetermediate level(s).

b.

Place a circle below the failure mode events (denotes a basic event).

LH2StorTankPressSys2_Failed
OR
|
|
|

/
|
VLV_AuxVapCntrl_Failed
OR
|
|
/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VlvFailsClosed
VlvFailsPartially
|
|
⃝
|
⃝
|
VlvFailsOpen
VlvLeaksExt
⃝
⃝

/
|
VLV_AuxVap and MainVap_Failed
AND
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
VlvLeaksInt
⃝

\

|
|
|
VlvPosUnknown
⃝

\
|
VLV_MainVapSO_Failed
OR
|
|
/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VlvFailsClosed
VlvFailsPartially
|
|
⃝
|
⃝
|
VlvFailsOpen
VlvLeaksExt
⃝
⃝

\
|
VLV_MainVapFlowCntrl_Failed
OR
|
|
/
|
|
|
|
\
|
|
|
|
|
|
VlvFailsClosed
VlvFailsPartially
VlvLeaksInt
|
|
|
⃝
|
⃝
|
⃝
|
VlvFailsOpen
VlvLeaksExt
VlvPosUnknown
⃝
⃝
⃝

Figure 14 - Excel/VBA Generated Partial FT
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|
|
VlvLeaksInt
⃝

\

|
|
|
VlvPosUnknown
⃝

As shown in Figure 14 - Excel/VBA Generated Partial FT), an FT can be generated with
minimal extension of SysML to include the basis events (failure modes) and the structure
internal to an IBD. Although there are limitations with the amount of information that can be
transferred in a matrix, the following lists the advantages of generating FTs directly from the
SysML model:
• Minimizes SME assistance for initial FT construction
o SMEs develop the IBDs so this expertise is propagated to initial FTs
o Stakeholder’s IBD design review updates also transmitted to FTs
• Initial FT all-encompassing (component level) with inclusion of components identified
within the SysML design
o It is easier to prune or modify an existing FT than build from
• Relationship matrix provides an easy method to add/delete prior to FT generation
• FT organization consistent with SysML model (IBDs)
o SysML updates transmitted to FTs
• Linkage between systems and potential failure modes collected in SysML model to
support other analysis

Fault Tree Auto-Generation Limitations
The primary limitation is the depth or layering of the components within the IBD. With a twodimensional matrix from which the data is transferred, capturing multiple levels of sub tiered
systems and components within the IBD cannot be accomplished for FT development. Inserting
multiple levels into an IBD can increase the complexity of that view, and subsequently, be
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counter-productive to its readability. Modelers may minimize this practice, but it should not be
restricted. For this method to be successful, multi-level IBDs must be further decomposed when
encountered. Therefore, implementing this technique has the potential to drive IBD design.

Identify and Categorize Sensor Data
The sensors convey the operational status of a remotely controlled system. As such, a sensor can
be defined as a component that provides feedback to the operator on the status of the system via
the command and control architecture. They are the only means of providing an operator the
visibility to determine the state of a monitored system. Therefore, the sensor array is the primary
mechanism that can restrict and/or enhance the insight into system performance. System health
and status is typically derived from sensors directly measuring a specific function, as well as a
combination of indirect measurements that may have influence over that portion of the
subsystem.

As the sensor array allows the system to be observed, it is very important to identify all the
sensors available within the system. This information will be used to refine the fault tree
developed for this system as the availability of measurements will influence the granularity of
the failure modes detected. If the fault tree has identified failure modes that the existing sensors
provide limited visibility and cannot reasonably detect, then it is not practical to expect an AD
system to overcome this deficiency. However, a couple of insights should be noted. First,
supplement AD systems are expected to be ‘smart,’ and perhaps capable of detecting issues with
limited indications in ways that may not appear obvious to an observer. Second, if the (limited89

visibility) failure mode is credible and has potentially serious consequences, then the correct
course of action may be a sensor modification to the system that facilitates detection of that
failure mode.

The sensor array will be the primary factor in resolving the failure modes identified by the fault
tree to those in consideration for the framework. For those components that have some degree of
sensor oversight, criticality will be assumed (and assumed non-critical if sensor visibility is
lacking). If indicator granularity can only provide insight to a subassembly level, then the
corresponding failure mode will only be identified to this level.

In the preliminary framework described in chapter 4, a matrix was proposed to identify and
categorize the sensor array (reference Table 4: Failures vs. Instrument Matrix). This matrix
would relate the potential faults to the system’s available measurements. In addition, the method
applied would annotate if that measurement was a direct or indirect means of detecting the fault.
This implementation would initially aid in reducing the potential faults being considered if it
could be determined adequate instrumentation was not available to uncover those issues.

For this case study, the means to identify and categorize the sensors will instead build upon the
current model (a systems engineering best practice). Relationship matrixes are fully available
within SysML, and can be generated and modified using a matrix format, or graphically within
the various SysML diagrams. Furthermore, the auto FT generator technique embedded the
applicable faults within the model structure making them readily available to associate with other
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model elements. The following will leverage off these existing faults to illustrate this
development task supporting the framework.

When developing a SysML model, a ‘parts list’ is generated in the process of identifying the
system structure. This is done by first creating Block Definition Diagrams (BDDs) depicting
higher level structure, and then decomposing this system structure until the individual
components are identified. Building off an accessible list within the model is not only efficient,
but has the ability to capture additional associations which further develops the underlying
structure of the model.

In addition to stand-alone instruments added to measure a given part of a system, indicators are
also embedded within components to provide status for that component. The most common
application for this case study are valves that are ‘switched’ to provide feedback to that valve’s
open, closed or intermediate position. These indicators can provide discrete data such as a limitswitches that are placed so that they get ‘depressed’ when a valve reaches a given position (i.e.
open/closed). A component may have 1 or more indicators to determine its position (reference
Figure 15 – BDD of Remote Valve with 1 or 2 Limit Switches). They can also be potentiometer
type indicators that provide an analog signal for variable position valves.
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bdd [Package] Operational Domain Model [Remote Operated Valv e]

«block»
RemoteOperatedValv e
parts
:
:
:
:

Act

«block»
Actuator
flowProperties
inout 750_GN2

PriCloseSV
Actuator
PriOpenSV
Valve

Vlv

«block»
Valv e

OSV

CSV

«block»
PriOpenSV

«block»
PriCloseSV

parts
: LimitSwitches

LS 1..2
«block»
LimitSw itches

Figure 15 – BDD of Remote Valve with 1 or 2 Limit Switches

An association between indicators and faults they could potentially detect could be made.
However, the majority of the indicators will have some degree of detection for most fault modes
which would result in a matrix that is mostly ‘filled-in.’ In addition, the process of assigning
indicators to faults could result in leaving out measurements that may have some unique way of
uncovering an issue. As this framework is intended to apply new technologies to many systems,
implementing a method that predetermines which sensors are applicable to which faults can be
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counterproductive. Subsequently, a method that readily identifies and categorizes all types of
measurements will suffice.

For this case study, all stand-alone indicator components are assigned part numbers prefixed with
“IND_,” and located in an Indicator package (embedded within a Component List package). A
BDD was created to organize and show temperature indicators (reference Figure 16 - BDD
Containing Temperature Indicators). To categorize the sensors, a package can be created for
each type of indicator inclusive to that system. This method provides both a parts list of all
indicators inclusive to the system as well as a means to quickly find that item within the
diagrams so that the instrument’s functionality can also be determined.
bdd [package] Indicator [IND-Temp]
«block»
IND-Temp-1

«block»
IND-Temp-2

«block»
IND-Temp-3

«block»
IND-Temp-4

«block»
IND-Temp-5

«block»
IND-Temp-6

«block»
IND-Temp-7

«block»
IND-Temp-9

Figure 16 - BDD Containing Temperature Indicators

The parts list comprised of BDDs will show all the components used within a system, and if
desired, how many of each of those components are used. The fault tree development process
addresses indicator failures. This section considers the need for associating indicator
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components to faults that they may detect as proposed within the initial framework. The goal
here was to use this information to help bound the number of credible faults to address only
those for which there is visibility. As stated above, linking indicators within an IBD to potential
faults they may detect will likely result in and association for nearly all (if not all) faults-toindicators. As an alternative, the association can be made at the BDD level, but this too could
produce an outcome of the same result in using the IBDs. These indicator BDDs will be the
means for identifying the system sensors and categorizing their attributes.

Identify and Categorize AD/FI Applications
The next step in this case study is to identify the AD/FI applications that should be considered
for implementation. This pre-selection process should be driven primarily by the project’s
requirements. As there are numerous applications and techniques available, a significant amount
of time can be spent researching all the possibilities which is not necessarily a practical
approach. To reduce this effort, AD/FI classes are identified in which the technologies are
similar. The onus for testing the various apps belongs to the users/stakeholders, though this
framework assists with the selection process.

Requirements
One of the primary objectives of building a system model is having the ability to generate
requirements, and then readily track implementation of those requirements through the system’s
life cycle. This capability is requisite within the systems engineering discipline, and SysML
provides this functionality by providing a requirements diagram. This diagram works with text94

based requirements in that it can show relationships among the assorted requirements, other
model elements and external objects (analysis, drawings, etc.) identified within the model. There
are various notations available that provide traceability of these relationships. A requirement
block (with associations) can also be dropped on other diagrams when it benefits the
stakeholders to have this visibility and corresponding relationships.

Mission Statement
Requirements are typically generated at a higher level, and then broken down into lower level
requirements as the design takes shape. For the LH2 system, a Mission Statement is created that
describes what the system will accomplish. This statement is parsed to derive the initial upper
level requirements for the system design. A requirements diagram is developed titled Mission
Statement Requirements (reference Figure 17 – Mission Statement/Requirements Diagram).
This diagram includes requirements ‘contained’ within the mission statement (those linked with
a plus within a circle in the figure). These are the higher-level requirements that will be
decomposed to system level ones that drive the design. In figure xx, a derived requirement
necessitating AD/FD capabilities was added subordinate to the ‘Safe Operations’ requirement.
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req [package] Mission Needs Statement [Mission Statement Requirements]
«requirement»
Mission Needs Statement
id = "MS-0"
text = "A mission needs statement will be
developed to describe the higher-level needs for
which a system design will be developed."

«requirement»
Fill Launch Vehicles
id = "MS-1"
text = "LH2 storage tank used to
fill space launch vehicles."

«requirement»
Remote Operations
id = "MS-2"
text = "Fill operations are
performed remotely."

The Mission Statement (MS)
requirements are parsed from the
Mission Needs Statement. These are
high-level requirements and form the
base that directs the system design.

«requirement»
Safe Operations
id = "MS-3"
text = "System has to operate
safely for both nominal and offnominal operations."

«deriveReqt»
«requirement»
Flow LH2
id = "MS-1.1"
text = "Ground and vehicle
systems result in back
pressure when trying to load
the vehicle."

«deriveReqt»

«requirement»
Automate Operations
id = "MS-2.1"
text = "Remote loading
operations are
automated."

«requirement»
Anomaly Detection/Fault
Isolation
id = "3.1"
text = "Provide anomaly
detection and fault
isolation capabilities"

«requirement»
Vent System
id = "3.2"
text = "Vent system to
provide safe disposal of
hydrogen gas generated
during loading."

«deriveReqt»

«requirement»
Stor Tank Press System

«requirement»
LH2 Transfer System

«requirement»
Control Room

id = "MS-1.1.1"
text = "Storage tank
pressurization will allow for
varying flow rates."

id = "MS-1.1.2"
text = "Will transfer LH2 from
storage tank to vehicle."

id = "MS-2.2"
text = "Remote operations
take place in a control
room."

Figure 17 – Mission Statement/Requirements Diagram

Mission Requirements
With a requirement embedded in the Mission Needs Statement that dictates AD/FI capabilities,
the mission requirements can now be developed. These are, for the most part, functional
requirements in that they qualitatively define what is expected of the AD/FI applications. These
requirements will drive the AD/FI technology to apply to the system. At this point, requirements
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can be decomposed that are specific towards covering the desired subsystems. Note that
requirements that focus on an explicit scenario may limit the available applications to consider.
Since there are many technologies available including some that work indirectly with available
data, the initial mission requirements should address overall AD/FI desires along with the
operator’s interface. A Mission Requirements (AD-FI) diagram was generated to collect and
organize the AD/FI requirements (reference Figure 18 - Mission Requirements). It is at this level
that the requirements will be used for selecting the potential AD/FI application(s) for
consideration. After the selection process is completed, these requirements can be further
decomposed to start showing implementation details for the system design.
req [package] Mission Requirements [Mission Requirements AD-FI]
«requirement»
Anomaly
Detection/Fault
Isolation
(from Mission Needs
Statement)

«deriveReqt»

«requirement»
Provide Anomaly
Detection Capability

«requirement»
Minimize cost

«deriveReqt»

«requirement»
Have means to notify
(alarm) the operator

«requirement»
Have a high level of
detection accuracy

«requirement»
Have ability to analyze
post-test data

«requirement»
Provide Fault Isolation
Capability
«deriveReqt»

«requirement»
Minimizes false alarms

«requirement»
Have means to notify the
operator

«requirement»
Provide real-time
monitoring of system

«requirement»
List all potential faulty
components

«requirement»
Have ability to limit list
to most-probable

«requirement»
Have ability to adjust
sensitivity of detection

Figure 18 - Mission Requirements
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«requirement»
List in order of fault
probability

A ‘minimize cost’ requirement was included with the mission requirements. As cost is always a
major factor in system design, it is important to include cost factors in the prescreening process.
A diagram is included that decomposes the cost requirement and provides additional detail as to
how costs will be controlled (reference Figure 19 - Requirements AD-FI Diagram).
req [package] Requirements AD-FI [Requirements AD-FI]
«requirement»
Minimize cost
(from Mission
Requirements)

«deriveReqt»

«requirement»
Minimal Development

«requirement»
Existing Application

«deriveReqt»

«requirement»
Use Existing Data

«requirement»
Minimize Number of
Applications

«deriveReqt»

«requirement»
Use Existing Hardware

«requirement»
Minimize Supporting
Applications

Figure 19 - Requirements AD-FI Diagram

Effectiveness Requirements
Effectiveness requirements provide a means to measure the system’s functional capabilities
against the expectations of the design. Developing effectiveness AD/FI requirements can be
quite challenging. Typically, a requirement is developed to meet a desired objective. As the
design takes into consideration the operating environment, an expectation of how the system will
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perform is rendered. Effectiveness requirements bring about ways to measure this performance.
The difficulty posed by dealing with anomalies is that systems are not (purposely) designed to
fail. Failures can occur for a variety of reasons to include component/material failure,
operation/environment excursions, design flaws, operator error, etc. Some failures will have an
immediate impact on system performance while others may slowly degrade before they reach a
point that is detrimental to operations. How a failure propagates thru the system can differ
based on the severity of the failure and the system configuration supporting the current process.
Fault trees are used to identify various failure modes, but the same failure may present itself
entirely different to the operators. For a complex system, it is unreasonable to wholly catalog the
number of abnormal conditions that may arise and how the instrumentation will respond with
certainty for all phases of operations. This means there are many ‘unknowns’ (which is, of
course, the rationale for applying AD/FI technology). Subsequently, trying to measure the
effectiveness in detecting this unknown can be challenging.

By identifying both functional and cost-related requirements, enough information is provided to
select which classes of AD/FI applications should be pursued. These requirements remain highlevel so as not to constrain the initial selection process too tightly. They are summarized below
(reference Table 5 – Requirement Summary).
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Table 5 – Requirement Summary
Req ID
AD-1
AD-1.1

Title
Provide Anomaly Detection Capability
Have means to notify (alarm) the operator

Description
Overall requirement to provide AD capability
Provide a means to notify operator of exceptions (via existing
C&C architecture or stand-alone system available to operators)
AD-1.2
Have ability to accurately detect issues above existing AD
Have a high level of detection accuracy
capabilities
AD-1.3
Minimizes false alarms
Minimizes nuisance-alarms that detract operators from system
monitoring
AD-1.4
Have ability to 'playback' data for post-test data reviews
Have ability to analyze post-test data
AD-1.4.1 Have ability to adjust sensitivity of detection Have ability to increase the sensitivity of post-test runs so all
exceptions are addressed (both nominal/off-nominal)
AD-1.5
Provide real-time AD monitoring during operations
Provide real-time monitoring of system
FI-1
Overall requirement to provide FI capability
Provide Fault Isolation Capability
FI-1.1
Have means to notify the operator
Provide a means to notify operator of exceptions (via existing
C&C architecture or stand-alone system available to operators)
FI-1.2
List all potential faulty components
When more than 1 potential source of an issue is possible, list all
possibilities
FI-1.2.1
Have ability to limit list to most-probable
When listing all possibilities, have the ability to limit what is
displayed (no scrolling pages)
FI-1.2.2
When listing multiple issues, rank in order of probability and
List in order of fault probability
display in this order
ADFI-1
Minimize cost (AD/FI)
Overall requirement to minimize ADFI costs
ADFI-1.1 Minimal Development
Minimize overall development related to adding ADFI
technology
ADFI-1.1.1 Use Existing Data
Use existing data already available to support applications (i.e.
system empirical data, existing models, etc).
ADFI-1.1.2 Use Existing Hardware
Use existing system instrumentation and C&C architecture
(mimimize system modifications)
ADFI-1.2 Existing Application
Use existing AD and/or FI applications either commercially
available or mature in development process
ADFI-1.3 Minimize Number of Applications
Minimize the number of aumented applications to meet
requirements
ADFI-1.3.1 Minimize Supporting Applications
Use only existing models or applications necessary to
supplement ADFI applications

AD-FI Initial Selection
Classes of both AD and FI applications/technology have been previously identified. These
classes attempt to group individual techniques utilizing common methodology. This framework
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will first distinguish which classes have the potential to meet requirements, and then focus on
advancing these. These classes include:
•

•

Anomaly Detectors
o

Nearest Neighbor/Clustering Algorithms

o

Neural Network

o

Statistical/Parametric

o

One-Class Support Vector Machines

Fault Isolators
o

Physics Model

o

Expert Systems

o

Fault Map Model

Anomaly Detection
For AD, there are several existing techniques used for detecting LH2 system problems. These
include limit-setting, data plotting, software notifications and system video views. The use of
cameras to scan and monitor the physical system provides very limited AD capability. However,
they have occasionally detected vapor clouds generated by cryogenic leaks in areas that do not
have leak detection instrumentation.

Limit-setting allows the operators to set alarms above and/or below analog measurements, as
well as opposing states for discrete measurements. Limits can be set on all measurements and
modified as required when the system transitions to different phases. This provides an overall
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level of protection that goes well beyond a small subset of measurements that can be viewed at a
given time by the operator. As the alarms are set just inside the operational (or design)
specifications, they can provide notification prior to an exceedance for issues that do not
immediately initiate/propagate to unacceptable levels. This remains the predominant method for
detecting system anomalies. The application software for controlling the system has additional
AD functionality. Most valves have a design specification that identifies a maximum amount of
time a valve should cycle to its opposite state when operating nominally. The software monitors
all valve cycles, and displays the valve timing. If this exceeds specified values, and alarm is
generated.

Another existing AD method is the ability to plot system data real-time (this capability was not
available in Shuttle until approximately half-way through the program). Operators could select
related data and plot these indicators on a single display. This provided a graphical view of
performance over time vs. a ‘snapshot’ view provided by system displays. These plots made it
easy to spot data trends that started to diverge from ‘nominal.’ This proved to be valuable at
times as some anomalies could be seen developing long before an alarm was triggered. This
provides additional time for an operator to respond which is highly desirable in time-critical and
hazardous operations.
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AD Application Rankings
The AD applications under consideration are all data-driven detection techniques. This can be
expected for a couple of reasons. First, this is an existing system with a mature design. So
anomaly detection hardware (additional sensors) should already be embedded within the system.
There is a cost component to consider as modifying the system can be costly. Since the existing
sensor array met the original design requirements, adding additional sensors or detection
hardware may not be considered unless a potential (and credible) failure mode is uncovered with
severe consequences. For this case study, this is also reflected in a cost-related requirement that
dictates no additional hardware. Since modifying the system is not typically a viable option,
then the other option is to focus on the data that the system produces. This data is relatively
cheap and readily available. Based on the literature, researches are finding unique ways to yield
additional information from this data.

For remote systems, operators monitor displays to ensure indications remain within specified
parameters. Not every measurement can be found on a display, and a very limited number of
displays can be viewed concurrently. Subsequently, the operator’s overall visibility of the
system is very restricted. A limit-setting application compensates for this handicap by
monitoring all measurements and notifying the operator of exceedances by means of an alarm.
When data plotting (real-time) became available, operator recognition of deviations from
nominal trends became more discernible. This provided a way to detect failures that were
developing, but had not yet triggered an alarm. Again, the operator is constrained by a lack of
visibility into the overall system. The data-driven models all work to distinguish between
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nominal and off-nominal data. Having an application that can monitor a system and detect when
data points transition from normal-to-anomaly extends this ability beyond the visible plots, just
as the limit-setting application did for tolerance violations.

The AD functional requirements are intended to provide a higher-level detail as to what is
desired without overly restricting the potential AD candidate field. There are a couple of
requirements (can alarm, adds value over existing AD) that direct general necessities. There are
also a couple of performance ones written qualitatively (detection accuracy, minimize false
alarms). These may be later be decomposed to provide specific values that the application(s)
will need to meet. The remainder of the requirements address specific functions that are sought
after to support the LH2 system. These include:
•

Provide real-time monitoring of system
o The application must be able to function in a real-time environment. This is a tool
used to augment AD and should be available when time-critical decisions are
required. This can also be difficult to implement if the underlying algorithm has a
high level of computational complexity. The LH2 system will have hundreds of
indicators reporting at a sample rate of 10 per second

•

Have ability to analyze post-test data
o The application should not only work real-time, but also be able to playback test
data. All vehicle loadings require a post-test data review looking for irregular
events. This is accomplished while not time-critical. It should be noted that if the
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post test data reviews show nominal operations, that data set then gets added to
the training data used for subsequent operations
•

Have ability to adjust sensitivity of detection
o As the application is intended to support both real-time and post-test analysis, it
should allow for adjusting the sensitivity. Being able to desensitize the
application during real-time operations should limit the concern that a high
number of false alarms will just distract the operators. Post-test reviews are very
thorough as they account for every unexpected data point. A highly sensitive tool
will better support this effort.

•

Functions in multi-phasing and transient operations
o Much of the literature uses examples of where a system is operating, perhaps with
numerous dynamics involved (i.e. rocket engine runs), but it does so in a
relatively stable operational and/or configuration setting. This is not the case for
loading the vehicle with cryogenic fluids. There are multiple phases to load a
vehicle and each requires a change in configuration. When using limit-settings
and a transition is required, the applicable limits are inhibited. Once the transition
is complete, the limits are again activated to the changed levels that support the
new phase. The AD application needs to be versatile enough to accommodate the
various phases. It is also desirable to monitor the system transients as limitsetting is inhibited at this time leaving only visual display monitoring for issue
detection.

105

As budget is often a major factor in determining if a project goes forward, cost requirements are
needed to ensure investment does not exceed the value-added. As this technology tends to be
customized towards user with unique purposes, there are very few commercial applications
readily available. Therefore, developing an application to meet requirements is a possibility.
This also means estimating the project cost is much more difficult as there many unknown
variables at this point in the life-cycle. Subsequently, the cost requirements are written such they
minimize development, implementation and maintenance costs associated with a new
application. This is an indirect way of controlling costs associated with the ambiguity
surrounding new development.

A matrix was developed showing both requirements and AD classes (reference Table 6 Requirement/AD-Class Matrix). This uses a simple scoring system to rank the AD classes. It
does give partial credit if it is known that at least some of the requirement can be satisfied or if it
is unknown if it can be satisfied at all. This is intended to lower the scores for those classes that
require additional research without ruling them out completely by scoring ‘does not meet.’ The
requirement/AD-class were scored as follows:
•

0=Does Not Meet Requirement

•

1=Partially Meets Requirement or Unknown

•

2=Meets Requirement
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Table 6 - Requirement/AD-Class Matrix
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Provide Anomaly Detection Capability
Have means to notify (alarm) the operator
2
2
Have a high level of detection accuracy
1
1
Minimizes false alarms
1
1
Have ability to analyze post-test data
2
2
Provide real-time monitoring of system
2
1
Have ability to adjust sensitivity of detection
2
2
Functions in multi-phasing and transient ops
1
1
Adds value above existing AD capabilities
1
1
Totals: 12
11
Minimize Cost (AD/FI)
Minimal Development
2
1
Uses Existing Data
2
2
Uses Existing Hardware
2
2
Existing Application
2
1
Minimize Number of Applications
1
1
Minimize Supporting Applications
1
1
Totals: 10
8
Grand Totals: 22
19

2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
11

2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
11

1
2
2
1
1
1
8
19

1
2
2
1
1
1
8
19

Within the functional requirements, the applications scored very closely. As these are all datadriven techniques, this is not unexpected. The basic difference between the classes is how they
determine data is normal or anomalous. Therefore, the ability to meet functional requirements
should be similar. For the performance related requirements, it is unknown if they can be met so
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these too are comparably scored. However, there is an exception within the NearestNeighbor/Clustering class. NASA has developed an AD application called Inductive Monitoring
System (IMS) (“Inductive Monitoring System,” n.d.). They have licensed this technology on a
non-exclusive basis in that it will be made available for use in NASA applications. As this
application is being used in industry and supporting real-time applications, it will be assumed it
can meet the real-time requirement. Although the literature is generally favorable in the
detection capabilities for all the AD classes, these were specific cases that are not necessarily
common to the LH2 system. Subsequently, requirements related to detection skills are rated
‘unknown.’

As IMS is an existing application ready to adapt to a given system, it will require less
development as the core algorithm is already functional. This advantage gives the NearestNeighbor/Clustering class a favorable ranking for the cost related requirements. Therefore, a
down-selection will be made at this time to pursue a Clustering application. However, as the
ability of this application to function well within the LH2 system remains unknown, further
analysis will be required.

FI Application Rankings
There are three classes identified related to FI. The first is a physics model. It is presumed that
the model can mimic system operations, and if the system goes off-nominal, the model can be
adapted to determine why. The second method involves an expert system. Such a system
involves developing a knowledgebase, and then uses this information to follow a path that leads
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to the root cause of the issue. It does this by incrementally performing a series of tests. The
result of each test determines which test is next applied. The third class is termed a fault map
model. This technique also develops a knowledgebase that maps the individual failures to the
sensors used to detect that failure.

A complex system will have a very large number of potential failures. Often, a failure will
propagate through the system further disrupting performance and possibly creating additional
failures. As this propagation is dependent on system configuration, and this often changes for
the LH2 system, it is not easily predictable. With a large number of potential failures,
propagation unpredictability and a sensor array that provides a limited view of the system,
isolating the issue to a specific component cannot always be accomplished during remote
operations. Therefore, an FI application should be able to list multiple possible failure modes.

The LH2 system is composed of approximately 2,500 labeled components (this does not include
piping, wiring, fittings structural components that also comprise the system). As shown during
fault tree development, each component can have multiple failures. As each of the FI classes
under consideration need this information to function, generating the applicable knowledgebase
will be labor intense. In addition, relating these failures (and propagation) to the instrumentation
that detects them requires system expert knowledge.

The FI functional requirements are intended to provide a higher-level detail as to what is desired
without restricting options as with the AD functional requirements. These requirements include:
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•

Have means to notify the operator
o The application needs to display results to the operator. This can be an automated
report (triggered from an alarm) or a manual request by the operator. This
application can run embedded within the existing C&C architecture, or from a
standalone platform.

•

List all potential faulty components
o As it is unlikely that an FI application will be able to settle on a definitive
problem, all suspect issues should be displayed to the operators.

•

Have ability to limit list to most-probable
o When displaying multiple issues, the operator should have the means to limit the
displayed items. This protects against a failure (i.e. major C&C component) that
can generate hundreds of alarms, and subsequently, hundreds of potential faults
(limits scrolling pages).

•

List in order of fault probability
o When displaying multiple issues, order the list so that ‘most-likely’ items are
shown first. This requires a means to assign a probability score to the possible
fault causes.
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The cost-related requirements used for AD ranking were developed to minimize development
costs, and these same requirements apply to the FI applications. A matrix was generated to rank
the FI classes using the same 0-2 scoring method (reference Table 7 - Requirement/IF-Class
Matrix).
Table 7 - Requirement/IF-Class Matrix

el
od

e
yst
rt S

del
Mo
ap
lt M
Fau
m

e
Exp

sM
si c
Ph

Title

Provide Fault Isolation Capability
Have means to notify the operator
2
List all potential faulty components
1
Have ability to limit list to most-probable
2
List in order of fault probability
1
Totals: 6
Minimize Cost (AD/FI)
Minimal Development
1
Uses Existing Data
2
Uses Existing Hardware
2
Existing Application
1
Minimize Number of Applications
1
Minimize Supporting Applications
0
Totals: 7
Grand Totals: 13

2
1
2
1
6

2
1
2
2
7

1
2
2
1
1
1
8
14

1
2
2
2
1
1
9
16

The FI classes scored closely for the functional requirements with the only advantage given to
Fault Map Models. There is an existing application called TEAMS-RT that has been tested in
other NASA applications (“TEAMS-RT,” n.d.). This model does have the ability to rank the
suspect faults detected. It is unknown if the other classes can include this feature.
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For the cost-related requirements, a physics model by itself cannot provide fault isolation. As
the LH2 system under study does not have an existing physics model, a supporting model must
be generated to provide this capability. Therefore, this class did not meet the ‘minimize
supporting applications’ requirement. The Fault Map Model class had a slight advantage over
Expert Systems in that a commercial application is available (and tested in other NASA
projects). As Fault Map Models ranked slightly higher in both functional and cost requirements,
this class will be pursued further. It should be noted that there are still several unknowns
associated with this class and additional analysis will be required.

Model the System
By selecting a model-based system engineering (MBSE) approach, the system will be modeled
as part of the design process. SysML uses diagrams to convey graphically the various
subsystems to users. The power of an MBSE approach is the underlying structure generated that
links the various diagrams and model elements. Since diagram development with element
associations are part of the MBSE model construction, no additional effort is required to provide
information related to AD/FI applications. If augmenting an existing system that lacks the
requisite documentation in a readily usable format, then at a minimum, the system structure
should be modeled in SysML. For this case study, BDDs and IBDs will be developed for the
three major LH2 subsystems identified in the Scope Overview section to include:
•

Pressurization subsystem

•

Transfer subsystem
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•

Vent subsystem

A BDD is used to describe physical characteristics of a system and uses a ‘block’ to represent
those items. The system itself is a block which can be decomposed to subsystems, components
and parts as deemed necessary by the stakeholders. The BDD shows the relationships in a
hierarchal format. Since the BDDs identify all the components used within a system, this
information is used to define system scope. While a BDD shows the composition of a block, an
IBD differs in that it shows how the internal parts within a block are connected. This includes
the flow of matter, energy and data among these parts. This information will assist with the
generation of potential faults for the system.

LH2 Pressurization Subsystem
The LH2 pressurization system is used to pressurize the LH2 storage tank. This pressure,
combined with different sized valves or variable position valves, controls the flow rate to the
vehicle for the various loading phases. This system utilizes a main and auxiliary vaporizer (heat
exchangers), a variable flow control valve (main) and control valves (main & auxiliary) to
control the tank pressure. A BDD titled ‘LH2StorTankPressSys’ identifies the main components
that comprise this subsystem (reference Figure 20 - BDD/LH2StorTankPressSys).
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Figure 20 - BDD/LH2StorTankPressSys

As stated earlier, the BDD gives a view of the structure comprised of blocks in a hierarchy
format. An IBD shows the internal connections of the block to include any media that is passed
among those parts. The ‘LH2StorTankPressSys’ IBD shows how LH2 flows from the storage
tank to the vaporizer, is converted to gaseous hydrogen (GH2) and returned to the tank (reference
Figure 21 - IBD/LH2StorTankPressSys). As LH2 has an expansion ratio of approximately
833:1, a much larger volume is returned to the tank which drives the pressure upwards.
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Figure 21 - IBD/LH2StorTankPressSys

The ‘LH2StorTankPressSys’ is a higher level view of this subsystem. During the modeling
process, these higher-level diagrams will be further refined until adequate detail is represented
that meets the design, user, and stakeholder groups. As an example, in the
‘LH2StorTankPressSys’ BDD, there is a block titled ‘LH2VapCntrlVlvSys’ which is
decomposed further in a BDD of the same name (reference Figure 22 BDD/LH2VapCntrlVlvSys).
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Figure 22 - BDD/LH2VapCntrlVlvSys

The corresponding IBD shows the interaction among these components. Note that parts that are
not part of the corresponding BDD can still be included within the IBD when necessary to
enhance the diagram’s view (annotated “from IBD”). In addition, when the flow inputs and
outputs (matter, energy and data) do not originate or terminate within the diagram, these are
shown as ‘ported’ to the diagram’s frame (reference Figure 23 - IBD/LH2VapCntrlVlvSys).
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Figure 23 - IBD/LH2VapCntrlVlvSys

LH2 Transfer Subsystem
There are two valve control assemblies (ground systems) that control the LH2 flow to the launch
vehicle. One of these valve skids is located at the Pad in the vicinity of the storage tank, while
the other is on the mobile launcher platform just upstream of the Shuttle vehicle. A BDD
showing both valve complexes was developed. Note that all the valves on these skids are
included, though not all support LH2 transfer operations.
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The focus of this IBD is to depict the transfer of LH2 from the storage tank to the launch vehicle.
Therefore, some of the components listed in the BDD that do not directly support LH2 flow are
not included in this IBD.

LH2 Vent Subsystem
As LH2 is a cryogenic liquid that is constantly boiling, anywhere you have the potential to trap
liquid (i.e. storage/flight tanks, transfer line piping) must also have the ability to vent that part of
the system to prevent over-pressurization. For the system under study, there are four primary
generators of GH2 that require active control during loading operations to include:
1. The GH2 generated from the external tank while being filled.
2. A liquid bleed flow used to thermally condition the Shuttles’ engines.
3. The LH2 storage tank (following pressurization).
4. The cross-country transfer lines that can be independently isolated.
The Pad LH2 valve skid has the ability to vent the storage tank as well as the transfer line piping
between the Pad and MLP valve skids. The MLP LH2 valve skid controls venting of the transfer
line between this valve skid and the vehicle. It also controls the bleed flow from the vehicle.

Model the AD/FI Applications
When the down-selection was made to determine which AD and FI classes would be pursued, it
was noted that enough information was not available to determine if these classes could fully
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meet the requirements. This section will model the selected AD and FI classes so this
determination can be made.

Anomaly Detection Model
The AD class chosen was the Nearest Neighbor/Clustering method. This is a data driven
application. Data is ingested into the model (referred to as training data) which provides a
reference when later compared to test data. Data sources can be classified as supervised, semisupervised or unsupervised. Supervised data means that the data set includes both normal and
anomalous data that is ‘labelled.’ Labelled data is known to be normal or otherwise. Semisupervised data can include both normal and anomalous, but only the normal data is labelled.
Unsupervised data is not labelled (Goldstein & Uchida, 2016). For large datasets, it is typically
impractical to label the data. As this is the case for the LH2 system, only unsupervised data will
be utilized. This data comes from previous LH2 loadings that were deemed nominal following a
post-test review. This is not sufficient to label the data, but it does increase the level of
confidence that the data represents only nominal operations. When using unsupervised data, it is
assumed to be normal and all exceptions anomalous. However, it needs to be noted that such
datasets may include (undetected) abnormal data. In addition, divergence from nominal does not
always reflect an anomalous condition. It could mean the training data does not include all
variations that represent nominal operations.

The Nearest Neighbor and Clustering methods are two different techniques. These were
combined into a single class as the most common approach to implementing both involves
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determining the Euclidian distance of a test point to either its nearest neighbor(s), or to a central
point within a cluster. This class ended up ranked the highest because there is an existing
application that was originally developed by NASA and tested in various applications. This
application utilizes the Clustering model. The main advantage to this is that the center of the
clusters is calculated during the training phase, and that value is provided as a constant during
testing. The Nearest-Neighbor needs to know the test point so it can seek out the neighbors. By
shifting as much of the calculation process to the training-side of the model as possible, the
computational complexity during testing is reduced enabling the application to run real-time.

During the down-select process, there were four requirements that were flagged ‘unknown’
requiring further analysis. The Clustering AD process will be modeled to determine if these
requirements can be met. These requirements include:
•

Have a high level of detection accuracy

•

Minimizes false alarms

•

Functions in multi-phasing and transient ops

•

Adds value above existing AD capabilities

The K-Means model follows the methodology as described by the IMS developers (D. L. Iverson
& Field, n.d.). The initial testing will focus on a single cluster as the objective at this point is to
test the sensitivity of changes in test data. The training data is synthetic, but based on actual
parameters used within the LH2 system. The data types are also varied as this would be common
when developing the desired vectors for system monitoring. A vector would be composed of
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measurements that are in some way related to one another (user defined). This is intended to
capture system performance by monitoring sensor groups that are influenced by associated
operations.

Sensitivity Analysis
The K-means algorithm makes the nominal/off-nominal determination of a data point based on
its distance from the cluster’s center. This application defines that center as the average between
the high and low values for each vector element. Subsequently, the only information needed to
support testing is the high and low values for each range within the vector. The training data
(single cluster) uses only ten inputs. This data is centered on the nominal value it represents,
though it was varied by +/- 1% via a random number function. So the total range of the data
within this cluster does not exceed 2% (reference Table 8 - Training Data).
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Table 8 - Training Data

Training Data

Nom

Min
Max

Press1
100
99.04
100.48
100.43
100.06
99.97
100.41
100.70
99.21
99.0
100.7

Press2
750
744.03
756.60
754.45
755.54
743.15
755.18
746.93
743.52
743.1
756.6

Press3
3000
3004.98
2980.02
2985.01
2991.16
3013.36
3003.67
2971.44
3008.02
2971.4
3013.4

Temp1
-423
-420.06
-425.34
-421.87
-421.39
-424.95
-422.32
-418.85
-425.55
-425.5
-418.9

Temp2
85
85.78
84.23
85.16
85.75
85.33
85.33
84.68
85.82
84.2
85.8

VlvPos(%)
100
99.55
100.70
100.60
100.46
100.66
99.45
99.30
99.81
99.3
100.7

The measurements chosen have quite a bit of disparity in the numerical values. To determine the
distance a test point falls away from the cluster’s center, a Euclidian metric is used. As this
method determines a vector length, larger values will have a disproportional impact on this
distance. Therefore, the data should be normalized before entered into the vector. There may be
cases when it is desirable for the model to be more sensitive to critical indicators. These
parameters should still be normalized, but can then be weighted to obtain an elevated (or muted)
response. All data will be normalized to a 0-1 scale per equation 1.
𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =

𝑋𝑋 − 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀

(1)

The model works by finding the distance between two points: the cluster center and individual
test data. If a = (a1, a2,…,an) and b = (b1, b2,…,bn), the Euclidian distance (d) between points a
and b is shown below (equation 2).
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𝑑𝑑(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = �(𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑏𝑏1 )2 + (𝑎𝑎2 − 𝑏𝑏2 )2 + ⋯ + (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 − 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 )2

(2)

The training data tracks the high and low values for the entire range of each parameter for a
given cluster. As it uses the average of these two values, the normalized value for each element
results in ‘0.5’. Equation 2 can be summarized as follows:
𝑛𝑛

(3)

𝑑𝑑(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = ��(0.5 − 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 )2
𝑖𝑖=1

With the training data established for a single cluster, the test data can be formulated. This data
will start nominally, and then be manipulated to simulate various anomalies. This initial testing
will assist in determining the sensitivity of the model to detect deviations from normal. For
demonstration purposes, the test data will be limited to a count of fifty. Each vector length is
calculated and then plotted. When data is nominal, a baseline is formed. An upward deflection
from this baseline is an indication that one or more of the monitored sensors is deviating from
nominal. It is this visual cue that alerts the operator that the system has changed. An alarm can
be established by setting a threshold above the baseline.

The initial data selected does not represent a related subsystem. This data was chosen to model
the responsiveness of a sensor grouping that includes both extremes (nominal pressures from 100
to 3000 PSIG; temperatures from 85 to -423oF) and common values (pressure and valve position
with a nominal value of 100). Initial values are from actual data and all fall within the training
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data’s min/max values, or are very close. This ensures the initial vector generated would be
assigned to this cluster.

The first test will increment a single parameter (100 PSIG) in the test data. Typically, a 100
PSIG system would have an operating range of +/- 10% (90 – 110 PSIG). The low and high
alarm limits would be set to those operational limits. A plot of this test is presented below
(reference Figure 28 - Single Indicator Test). The first 10 samples represent a nominal baseline.
This measurement is incremented by 1 PSIG at every 10th sample (to 5%). The min/max values
for this indicator are 99.04 and 100.70 respectively (reference Figure 24 - Single Indicator Test).
The first increment to 101 PSIG moved the parameter just outside its max-value, and the plot
registered a slight increase from baseline. As data toggles around a value, the baseline will
oscillate to reflect these slight variations. With each subsequent increment, the test data moved
further from the cluster as exhibited with the upward trend from baseline. A 5% increase on a
single variable resulted in a distance value that is more than triple the baseline.
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Figure 24 - Single Indicator Test

The next test involves incrementing multiple variables within the vector. These values were
adjusted both upward and downward. The first 20 data points remain the same as in the previous
test (baseline and 1% increase on 1 indicator). The subsequent samples represent a 1% increase
on a different measurement every 10th sample (reference Figure 25 - Multiple Indicator Test).
Similar to the previous test, a 1% increment has a slight impact to the baseline. In addition, the
last variable incremented brings the baseline back down (Temp-2). This measurement’s initial
value is set just under the min-value for this parameter. So a 1% increase brings the distance
closer to the cluster as depicted by the plot. An upward trend can be noted, but not necessarily
significant enough to warrant additional evaluation.
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Figure 25 - Multiple Indicator Test (1%)

The next plot is the same five indicator test, but with 2% increments (reference Figure 26 Multiple Indicator test (2%)). The upward trend is now more noteworthy. Had this been an
interrelated grouping of measurements, this would have flagged the operator that the system was
changing in a way not captured by the training data. It should also be noted that the ten-sample
increments are intended to test sensitivity. If the change in the system did influence five of the
six vector elements, the plot would have captured this over the transient range. For short
duration transients, this could make the plotted shift more apparent. A longer duration trend may
not be as obvious. This is rationale for including a threshold limit as subtle trend changes may
not be easy to observe, but a declining gap between trend and threshold should be noticed.
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Figure 26 - Multiple Indicator test (2%)

The previous tests held the test data fixed so that the actual impact from a change in state was
easily observed. However, data from dynamic systems often have noise associated with the
measurement (frequent oscillations above/below a value). The previous tests will be repeated,
but this time with noise being introduced into all the test variables. This is accomplished by
generating a random number that is +/- 1% of the nominal value, much like what was done with
the training data. The noise will be maintained while the data is being manipulated to simulate a
change in the system. This 2% total range is aggressive for simulating noise as it is not often
observed to this extent. It will also be applied to all the test variables, though many
measurements are often stable indications. Consequently, this test case should represent a
worse-case scenario. As the baseline is not so easily distinguished with noisy data, a full-run
plot is displayed showing only the baseline from which subsequent test plots build upon
(reference Figure 27 – Baseline Data (Noisy)).
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Figure 27 – Baseline Data (Noisy)

The first 20 samples now represent a nominal baseline and the measurement is incremented by 1
PSIG at every 20th sample to 5% (reference Figure 28 - Single Indicator Test (noisy)). There is
no longer a discernable ‘step’ formation with the plot. However, there is an obvious upward
trend that is approximately three times that of the baseline. This is consistent with what was
observed with the non-noisy test.
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Figure 28 - Single Indicator Test (noisy)

The next two tests involve incrementing multiple variables within the vector. A new indicator
was added to the plot every 20th sample. Each new value was increased by either 1% (reference
Figure 29 - Multiple Indicator Test (1% - Noisy)), or 2% (reference Figure 30 - Multiple
Indicator Test (2% - Noisy)) based on the nominal target, which is then modified to continue
mimicking noise. An upward trend can be noted in both plots, though it is much more
predominant with 2% adjustments.
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Figure 29 - Multiple Indicator Test (1% - Noisy)

Figure 30 - Multiple Indicator Test (2% - Noisy)
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Transition Analysis
One of the requirements levied is that the AD application function during the different
operational phases and be able to capture transient conditions. As the limit settings for the
indicators monitoring these transitions are inhibited between phases, much of the alarms are not
available for these short durations. Hence, an AD application that can determine if the transition
was nominal or not was deemed desirable.

For this testing, data was used from both STS-134 and STS-135 Shuttle missions (reference
Figure 31 - STS-134 LH2 Loading (SF to FF) and Figure 32 - STS-135 LH2 Loading (SF to
FF)). This data includes several pressure sensors and one temperature measurement. These
indicators are related in that changes in the flow of LH2 will influence all four indicators. The
data from the STS-134 mission will be used as the training data for the model. Both missions
took place on Pad A. STS-134 used MLP-2 while STS-135 took place on MLP-3. The
timeframe within the loading operations targets the transition from Slow Fill (approximately 900
GPM) to Fast Fill (approximately 8000 GPM).
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Figure 32 - STS-135 LH2 Loading (SF to FF)

Figure 31 - STS-134 LH2 Loading (SF to FF)
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LH2 Slow Fill involves a low flow rate, and all three pressures can be seen to be near-equal. As
the LH2 external tank (ET) is loaded under pressure, the line pressures are gradually increasing.
For STS-135, an ET vent cycle is observed just before transition as noted by the transfer line
pressure drop that precedes an increase. Fast Fill is initiated by opening a larger fill valve
increasing the flow rate from approximately 900 GPM to 8,000 GPM. The transfer line
pressures all increase, but the impact of the various flow restrictions becomes obvious at the
higher flow rate based on the disparity among the pressure measurements. The ET vent valve
cycling becomes more frequent as depicted by the oscillations seen in the pressures.

The temperature is slowly decreasing towards that of LH2, and is within 2oF at the latter part of
Slow Fill. When Fast Fill is initiated, the temperature starts to decline quicker as the transfer line
pressure is elevated (flow rate increased). During this transition, it is typical to see a slight
upward spike in temperature caused by liquid hitting the un-wetted surfaces which generates
additional boil off of liquid. As the line completely fills with liquid, a rapid chill down to LH2
temperatures occurs.

Although the temperature decline profiles shown in figures 35 and 36 are similar, there is a shift
between the two. These values are scaled the same, and the value ranges shown in the plots
equate to approximately 1.5oF for each indicator. Therefore, this is high-granularity data
(instrument range is -409oF to 427oF). Assuming the temperature of LH2 remains constant (at
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pressures shown), a bias can be determined when the temperatures bottom-out. In this case, it is
approximately 0.8oF. Although this is a low value, and an acceptable bias, it is significant when
compared to the 1.5oF. The following plot includes the K-Distance with the STS-135 data
(Figure 33 - STS-135 Flow and K-Distance).

Figure 33 - STS-135 Flow and K-Distance
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The K-Distance value shows the system is off-nominal (compared to the STS-134 data) during
Slow Fill. One of the advantages of a K-Means methodology is it is easy to determine which
variable(s) are responsible for the deviation. In the following table (reference Table 9 - Elements
used for K-Distance), K-Distance is the variable plotted (against GMT). Also shown are the
normalized values of the four variables that make up this distance calculation. Only the Orbiter
Inlet temperature is (significantly) over one making this temperature the only outlier.

Table 9 - Elements used for K-Distance
P-SkidIn P-SkidOut P-OrbIn T-OrbIn
GMT K-Dist
5.504
0.40
6.00
6:46:39
0.60
0.67
0.60
0.50
0.40
6.00
6:46:39
5.502
0.20
0.50
0.40
6.00
6:46:40
5.509
0.40
6.50
6:46:40
6.008
0.20
0.50

The next test pulls the temperature out of the plot to see how K-Distance works with the three
pressure values during transition (reference Figure 34 - Pressure and K-Distance). An increasing
trend during Slow Fill shows some disparity compared to the training data, but at just over a
value of 1.0, this is not considered problematic. A spike to just over 3.0 during transition is
noted. K-Distance then returns to nominal, though it does track with the ET vent valve cycles.
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Figure 34 - Pressure and K-Distance

Finally, the same data is used but with a failure inserted. The Skid Inlet pressure was held at a
fixed value during the ramp up to Fast Fill pressure (reference Figure 35 - Pressure and KDistance with Failure). This failure mimics a loss of communication to the sensor, and
subsequently, the value in the buffer does not change. When this type of failure occurs within
the measurement’s limit settings, an alarm is not produced. If it is close to nominal system
values, it is not easily recognized on a system display view. This failure type can be
distinguished on a plot, with dynamic data, as it is characterized by a ‘flat line.’ The K-Distance
plots the same during Slow Fill and transition, but once the failure is inserted, it climbs to
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approximately 4.0. In this case, the K-Means AD method did well to identify a failure occurring
during transition.

Figure 35 - Pressure and K-Distance with Failure

Fault Isolation Model
All three of the original FI classes require extensive support to implement this capability into a
large system. A single-fault method would look at all components and the various failure modes
that they can experience. If there is a need to consider multiple faults, then this effort can grow
quite quickly. To start this mapping exercise, the focus will be on individual components. In
addition, if a components’ failure mode cannot be traced to a detecting indicator, then it is not
137

included. For example, filters have a failure mode in which the filter media fails allowing
possible contaminants to pass. Such a failure would likely be undetectable by monitoring system
pressure. However, debris may now pass the element and block flow thru a downstream orifice.
A plugged orifice can be detected by a drop in downstream pressure. Subsequently, the model
will (possibly) fault the orifice, which is behaving anomalously, though the root cause of the
problem is the failed filter element.

Failure modes for components that cannot occur do to configuration are also omitted. This drops
modes such as ‘internal leakage’ or ‘failure to close’ for valves that remain open during the
entire operation. The initial pass at mapping the system will concentrate on single fault
scenarios. It is projected that the model will be expanded to include multiple faults and all
modes identified on the system fault tree. With this initial pass, modes such as ‘relief valve fails
to open’ are excluded as it first requires a failure to over-pressurize the system.

As a fault map model was the selected class, the focus will now be on developing one that
encompasses the LH2 system. The literature review was unable to uncover detail methods
utilized by the (very few) vendors. So Excel will be employed to capture and organize the data
needed to generate the mapping. It is anticipated that any application selected to implement this
technology will have the capability to either work with Excel data (either by linking to the file or
importing the desired data). The following outlines the fields to be populated:
•

Component - As labeled by its unique identifier

•

Description – Components nomenclature
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•

Failure Mode - As identified by the SysML model, and as required based on component
configuration

•

Sensor – The primary indicator used to detect the failure identified.

•

State – The indicators’ state that flagged the issue (high, low, erratic, nominal)

•

Additional Sensor and corresponding State fields as required to characterize multiple
sensors used in detection

With a fault map knowledgebase being created within Excel (using the fields defined above), the
FI inputs can be tested while the knowledgebase is being produced. Simply adding a filter to
each of the fields enables the operator to select an offending measurement to get a list of
potential component faults. If there are multiple sensors available with applicable states, these
too can be selected to refine the list, thus allowing the SME to test inputs in parallel with
development. To model this effort, a knowledgebase for a purge panel feeding the LH2 transfer
lines was generated. A high limit setting is exceeded for one of the indicators (PT057), which is
then selected (reference Table 10 - Fault Map (PT057-High)).
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Table 10 - Fault Map (PT057-High)
Comp
HR051
HR051
HR051
HR051
HR051
HR051
HR051
DR054
DR054
DR054
DR054
DR054
DR054
DR054
RV059
RV059
RV059
FL063
FL063
MV105
SV060
SV065
SV038
PT057
PT057
PT057

Description
3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome)
3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome)
3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome)
3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome)
3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome)
3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome)
3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome)
3000/750 Dome Reg
3000/750 Dome Reg
3000/750 Dome Reg
3000/750 Dome Reg
3000/750 Dome Reg
3000/750 Dome Reg
3000/750 Dome Reg
750 Relief Valve
750 Relief Valve
750 Relief Valve
750 Filter
750 Filter
750 Purge-Leg Iso Valve
Vent Line Purge Sol Valve
Fill Line Purge S/O Sol Valve
Fill Line Purge Sol Valve
750 GHe Press
750 GHe Press
750 GHe Press

Failure Mode
RegCreepsHigh
RegCreepsLow
RegFailsClosed
RegFailsOpen
RegLeaksExt
RegLeaksInt
RegPressUnstable
RegCreepsHigh
RegCreepsLow
RegFailsClosed
RegFailsOpen
RegLeaksExt
RegLeaksInt
RegPressUnstable
VlvFailsOpen
VlvLeaksExt
VlvLeaksInt
FilterPlugged
FllterLeaksExt
VlvLeaksExt
VlvLeaksExt
VlvLeaksExt
VlvLeaksExt
IndHigh
IndLow
IndErratic

Sensor-1
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057

State-1
High
Low
Low
High
Low
High
Erratic
High
Low
Low
High
Low
High
Erratic
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
Erratic

Sensor-2
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076

State-2
High
Low
Low
High
Low
High
Erratic
High
Low
Low
High
Low
High
Erratic
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low

Sensor-3

State-3

PT047

Low

PT047

Low

PT076
PT076
PT076

Nominal PT5977
Nominal PT5977
Nominal PT5977

Nominal
Nominal
Nominal

This results in a list of 26 component/failure combinations. Since a high limit was exceeded, the
state of the corresponding sensor is then filtered on ‘high,’ reducing the potential failures to
seven. A secondary indication (PT076) is also available for the remaining faults (this could be
multiple indicators). The field filtering can continue, but with only 7 items listed, the logic can
be carried out by observation (reference Table 11 - Fault Map (PT076 Check)). If a review of
PT076 in the timeframe that the alarm was received showed no change in status, then a failure of
PT076 is suspected, which can be further confirmed by looking to see if PT5977 remained
nominal. For this example, we will assume PT076 also diverged high (it does not have to set off
an alarm), leaving one additional indicator (PT047) that could have been influenced by the
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change in system status. If this trended downwards, then the FI leads to two possible faults (vs.
six if it remained nominal). These include the hand or dome regulators to have failed open.

Table 11 - Fault Map (PT076 Check)
Comp
HR051
HR051
HR051
DR054
DR054
DR054
PT057

Description
3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome)
3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome)
3000/750 Hand Reg (Dome)
3000/750 Dome Reg
3000/750 Dome Reg
3000/750 Dome Reg
750 GHe Press

Failure Mode
RegCreepsHigh
RegFailsOpen
RegLeaksInt
RegCreepsHigh
RegFailsOpen
RegLeaksInt
IndHigh

Sensor-1
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057
PT057

State-1
High
High
High
High
High
High
High

Sensor-2
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076
PT076

State-2
High
High
High
High
High
High
Nominal

Sensor-3

State-3

PT047

Low

PT047

Low

PT5977

Nominal

Assuming PT047 did drop, this implies either the hand or dome regulator failed open. Hand and
dome regulators work in parallel. Hand regulators provide finite control in manually setting an
operational pressure. The trade-off is that this manual control capability results in a component
used in low flow applications. Dome regulators have the capacity for high-flow, but cannot be
manually adjusted. Pressure is set by applying the desired pressure into the top (dome) of the
regulator using a hand regulator.

The failure logic for this scenario is described as follows. When a regulator fails open, it is no
longer able to control pressure, and the downstream side of the regulator is exposed to the
upstream pressures (3,000 vs. 750 PSIG). If the hand regulator fails, it applies 3,000 PSIG to the
dome regulator which then opens fully. This is the same outcome if the dome regulator fails
open. In both cases, the 750 PSIG system is now exposed to 3,000 PSIG, though this leg
includes a relief valve to protect against over-pressurization. There is another pressure reduction
in this leg (750 to 80 PSIG) via a hand regulator only. If the upstream pressure to this regulator
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spikes to relief pressure (880 PSIG), then an upward deflection would be expected on the 80
PSIG leg, monitored by PT076. Since the dome regulator is capable of high flow, combined
with the high upstream pressure, it is likely flowing through the relief valve (which is sized to
handle the maximum flow). Therefore, a drop in upstream pressure is expected (PT047) as the
system struggles to maintain 3,000 PSIG with off-nominally high flow.

Perform Trade Studies
When the preliminary framework was developed, it was envisioned that after down-selecting to
classes that best met requirements, there would be many options to choose from. This did not
turn out to be the case. The existing limit-setting, plot capabilities and software controls
employed in industry (and current KSC launch systems) are sufficient for most applications. In
addition, the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC’s) that have become common in remoteoperated control systems are embedded with health and status capabilities specific to C&C
functions. Subsequently, proficient AD/FI expertise supporting control systems is included with
the purchase of this hardware. There is an abundance of techniques found within the literature,
but most have not advance beyond the conceptual phase. This does not diminish the need for
this technology, but it does limit the commercial options. This trade study will assess using an
available application or developing one internally. Both are viable options.

Anomaly Detection Application
A commercial application (IMS) exists that implements a K-Means method of AD. This
application can run both real-time and playback historical data. It allows the user to select the
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vector elements (variables) for inclusion and cluster size when inputting the training data. When
running, the user can assign a threshold over the k-distance to be used as an alarm. It also has
the ability to show how much each measurement contributes to the k-distance to readily
determine which indicators are off-nominal.

The k-means methodology was modeled using Excel. However, this application cannot provide
real-time system monitoring. It can provide playback of test data, but dataset size may overcome
Excel’s limitations requiring both training and test data be segmented. The clusters for the
model were developed manually, but this could be automated using an Excel macro. The other
functions provided by IMS (element selection, cluster radius, thresholds, variable contribution)
can all be mirrored in Excel.

The AD model testing also resolved the ‘unknown’ requirements as follows:
•

Have a high level of detection accuracy
o The model illustrated a sensitivity to change for both static and dynamic data
when compared to nominal training data. The training data is unsupervised, so
there could be anomalous information contained within. A diverging k-distance
shows a deviation from the training data which does not always reflect an offnominal condition.

•

Minimizes false alarms
o When ‘zoomed in’ on a high-resolution temperature indicator, testing did show a
significant deviation in k-distance. After a reviewing the plot, it was determined
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that an acceptable bias existed between the instruments on from two different
MLPs.
o These types of issues can be uncovered when testing historical data, and there
are several actions that can be taken to mitigate the issue as follows:


Training data can be matched to the launch elements used (i.e. use Pad A
and MLP-2 training data for launches using this combination). This
ensures the same sensors are being compared.



Add multiple launches to the training dataset. This will further minimize
the false alarms by capturing system variations within the training
dataset.



Each element within the vector can be weighted to amplify or mute the
impact on k-distance. The measurement tested is critical, so it would
likely not be muted. However, this is an option for other non-critical
sensors.

•

Functions in a multi-phasing/transient ops
o Testing (Slow Fill to Fast Fill) demonstrated that transient operations can be
captured.

•

Adds value above existing AD capabilities
o The sensitivity analysis showed that both single and multiple indicator
divergences can be detected well before a limit exceedance is triggered. This is
a very strong capability.

•

Minimizes number of applications and/or supporting applications
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o This adds only one new application and requires no supporting applications.

Fault Isolation Application
It should be noted the LH2 system has local gages for viewing the system status which are
located throughout the system. The fault mapping concentrates on a system configuration that
supports launch vehicle loadings as these are the time-critical and hazardous operations that take
place in a control room. The remote sensors available are a smaller subset of what can be
accessed locally. In one case, a storage area panel that provides pneumatic pressure to all the
remote operated valves is set up manually to support these operations. There are local gages
used to reflect the supply pressure and for setting up two pressure reductions, including primary
and secondary legs for the actuation pressure. However, the only remote sensor on this panel is a
pressure switch that is sensing only the actuation pressure leg. In this case, all the components
that can impact this pressure, and have a failure mode that results in a loss of pressure, will be
linked to the switch. Failures that increase pressure above nominal will go undetected.
Consequently, should this switch unexpectedly drop out, a large list of potential faults will be
generated. With only a discrete measurement providing notification, the information needed to
refine this list is just not available. Should the pressure dropout be real (and not a switch failure),
and pressure continues to drop, any actuated valves will soon change state confirming the loss of
pneumatic control.

This example is being presented to highlight that an FI application will be limited to what data is
provided by the sensor array (applicable for the physics, expert systems and fault map FI
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classes). Often, the fault cannot be isolated until the local hardware can be accessed to view the
local instruments and/or take additional troubleshooting steps. Therefore, expectations need to
be tempered for FI performance. During the analysis and development of an FI application,
system design shortcomings may be uncovered. These can be addressed to determine if a system
modification is warranted. Therefore, developing an FI knowledgebase also provides an indirect
system review which is also beneficial.

A commercial application known as TEAMS (described in literature review) is available for fault
mapping, and has been previously tested on a cryogenic test-bed at KSC. This application can
support real-time monitoring and includes a means to encompass system configuration (via
switches). There was only over-view information discovered as to how this application works,
so it was not modeled.

A component-sensor-fault related knowledgebase was developed using Excel. The fields
selected were those that are projected to be included should TEAMS (or another fault map
application) be selected. The reason for developing an internal knowledgebase is this need
amounts to an organization of data issue, and a means to present data in a timely manner with
minimal input. It was presumed that Excel could accomplish this task, so a model was
developed to test this functionality. Should an existing application be chosen, the effort to create
the knowledgebase within Excel will likely not be unproductive as it is anticipated this data can
be ported to other applications.
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The FI model testing also resolved the ‘unknown’ requirements as follows:
•

Lists all potential faulty components
o This requirement is partially met (by design). Per the filter/orifice example
described previously, FI will list all components it can link to the indicator(s) in
question. This may not include the root component responsible for the failure as
that failure mode may not be detectable with the current sensor array

•

Minimal development
o This requirement is partially met. There is minimal development related to
getting an application active. However, populating the application with all the
possible component/failure-modes will be an extensive and challenging exercise.

•

Minimizes number of applications and/or supporting applications
o This adds only one new application and requires no supporting applications.

Make Recommendations
For AD, the K-Means method was shown to be sensitive to changes when compared to previous
operations that were deemed nominal. The model testing resolved the unknown requirements,
and this application has the flexibility to be ‘dialed-in’ to meet various system peculiarities.
However, it needs to be reiterated that the training data is unsupervised, so it is possible that
abnormal data may be embedded within this dataset. The recommendation is to use the IMS
application. It was developed by NASA and they retained a licensing exemption that allows its
use for NASA programs.
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When the Shuttle program gained real-time plotting capability, this provided the ability to
monitor the system over time. As there is very limited monitor space, only one plot could be
viewed at a time. For implementation, it is envisioned that K-Means vectors would be built that
are common to a saved plot of related data. A display would be set up that showed multiple kdistance graphs. Should one of these start to diverge high, the corresponding plot would be
brought up so the operator can see the plotted data of the indicators of concern. This
methodology provides a ‘health’ indicator allowing the operator to indirectly monitor multiple
plots on a single display. In addition, a threshold value can be set that will alarm should a kdistance value exceed it (whether it is visible or not).

During the FI modeling, a knowledgebase was developed using Excel. The intent was to see if
the desired information could be presented with minimal user input. As the model for this
functionality turned out to be relatively easy, creating a comprehensive knowledgebase with
Excel is the recommendation going forward. If it later turns out that this is not sufficient, then a
fault-map application could be considered at that time. Both methods are level in their ability to
meet requirements, though minimal development could only be partially met. As this is an
extensive effort, Excel has an advantage in that it requires only SME support where those
inputting the model require both SME and FI application know-how.
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CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS/EVALUATION
A preliminary framework was proposed in Chapter 4 that provided a methodological approach to
selecting anomaly detection (AD) and fault isolation (FI) technologies that can be adapted to
complex systems. A case study was presented in Chapter 5 that followed this process to
augment the liquid hydrogen (LH2) system at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch pads.
This system supported loading the external tanks (ET) to support Space Shuttle launches, and
will be used again for NASA’s next-generation Space Launch System (SLS) rockets. As LH2 is
the fuel for the Shuttle main engines, it is very flammable. LH2 is also a cryogenic fluid (-423
o

F). This involves insulation challenges as the liquid is constantly boiling. To minimize losses,

the ET is not loaded until very late in the launch countdown (within ten hours of planned
launch). Loading the Shuttle is performed from a control room located several miles from the
launch pads. Therefore, these remote, time-critical and hazardous operations make the LH2
system a good candidate to supplement with AD/FI capabilities. This chapter will analyze the
case study and its implementation of the framework process, and then finalize the proposed
framework. This framework will then be validated by applying the process to the liquid oxygen
(LOX) system at KSC that is also used to load the ET.

Framework Analysis
The framework process follows the chart shown previously (reference Figure 8 - Preliminary
Framework Process Flow). This analysis will step through each process block and review the
details necessary to accomplish these steps. It will also note any changes that will be reflected in
the final version.
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Scope the System
Establishing the system scope not only identified the system boundaries under study, it also
identified exiting AD/FI capabilities. The LH2 system was broken to three major subsystems
(Pressurization, transfer and vent). The existing AD capabilities were described (no existing FI
functionality) so that new applications with common functionality are ground-ruled out.

This task did highlight a couple of items worth noting as this impacted the scope of this case
study. First, the command and control (C&C) system at KSC went through an upgrade utilizing
programmable logic controllers (PLCs). As this new C&C architecture has significant health and
status capability embedded within, further AD/FI augmentation was considered unneeded.
Second, as hydrogen is very flammable, and potentially explosive, the ability to monitor for
leaks and/or fires is considered crucial. This is already accomplished via a ‘HazGas’ subsystem
that has installed leak and fire detectors throughout the LH2 system.

Identify and Categorize Sensor Data
Identifying all the sensors supporting both AD and FI applications is a way to ensure inclusion of
all possible measurements. Sensors are monitored for nominal operations with AD, and used to
authenticate fault-modes with FI. Most system designs include a parts list (as does the LH2
system). However, when using SysML to model the system, it becomes intuitive to organize the
component blocks in ‘packages’ that reflect the component type for later retrievals. This was
helpful for itemizing the types of indicators. When these instruments are later depicted in IBDs
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(as instances of ‘part properties’), they are readily found within those diagrams, and IBDs also
reflect how they are used.

Identify and Categorize Fault Modes
For this case study, knowing the fault modes was not required to apply the selected AD utility.
AD focused on the ability to detect instruments deviating from the norm, and therefore, it did not
consider the faults that drove the disparity. The FI application requires that all faults be
identified, and those that can be detected by the system instrument array be catalogued within a
knowledgebase. As stated previously, this can be a comprehensive task for a complex system.

This framework development is guided by system engineering principles of which one best
practice is to leverage off of existing artifacts. If a SysML model is being developed, then the
corresponding IBDs will depict which components are within the system, and how they are being
used. This information might make it practical to auto-generate a fault tree (FT) using the
information generated by the system design. The model was extended by adding generic failure
modes (blocks) and allocating them to the components shown on the IBD (via a relationship
matrix). The matrix was exported to Excel, and a macro written to draw a basic fault tree as
described in Chapter 5. This task was successful in highlighting the potential of extending
SysML so that existing design constructs can assist in generating other design products. Fault
trees are typically generated as a separate project to the design effort. Safety engineering
oversees the development, though it is supplemented by the SME’s who have the required
technical expertise. Having the ability to auto-generate an initial FT that is directly related to the
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design documents is efficient in the use of engineering labor, less prone to mistakes and likely to
identify deficiencies in the design product(s) earlier in their life-cycle. This proof-of-concept
exercise focused on FT’s, but it is foreseen that other design or operational products could
benefit from SysML’s flexibility in working with its core data.

Identify and Categorize AD/FI Applications
This section of the test case started with the discussion on requirements. One of the changes to
the framework process chart is to pull the requirements development out into its own block
following the system scope effort. The functional requirements development does need to follow
the system scope. While defining system scope, having to apply AD/FI was ground-ruled out for
C&C functions and Leak & Fire detection. In addition, the existing AD/FI methods were
appraised. It is expected that the detection results will overlap, but the detection methods should
not be common. This type of information is helpful before functional requirements are
produced.

Requirement generation was planned to precede the AD/FI selection process, so the preliminary
framework scheduled this activity accordingly. However, since the sensor and fault (more so the
faults) organization can be a comprehensive undertaking, the requirements should be defined
prior to committing resources to this effort. These actions are shown in parallel with the system
categorization items, but the process flow will be changed to drive the requirements generation
prior to additional work following system scope.
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The requirements generated were categorized as functional (qualitative) and cost related. They
were purposely kept at a higher level for several reasons. For the functional requirements, a
concern exits that requirements that are too restrictive may exclude technologies that provide
considerable benefit to the system. Also, as this system is being augmented with additional
AD/FI, the current operational needs are satisfied by the implementation of the original design
requirements. On the cost side, the requirements are written generically to keep potential project
expenses minimized. The case study had to decide between existing applications or internal
development. These options have different means of costing that impact different groups.

Modeling the AD/FI technologies is time consuming, and therefore, modeling all the potential
applications is not practical. In addition, many methods found in the literature did not provide
adequate details to build a test model. To lessen the potential effort, both the AD and FI
applications were divided into classes based on common underlying techniques used to realize
their objective. These classes were then ranked based on their ability to meet requirements. This
is an intermediate step intended to reduce the potential candidates to a class that is most likely to
meet system needs.

There is a cost requirement that gives priority to an existing application (or mature
development). This requirement is based on an assumption that it is cheaper to purchase a
software license than it is to internally develop and sustain this functionality. In addition,
commercially available packages publish the capabilities of the product making it easier to
determine which functional requirements they could satisfy. Thus, the requirements derived for
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this case study favor such applications (both directly and indirectly) as reflected in the downselect decisions. The ability of the chosen classes to meet the functionality requirements, related
to performance, remained mostly ‘unknown.’ Resolving these unknowns is what drives model
development and subsequent testing.

Model the System
This framework is designed to work with both new projects and legacy systems. As the SysML
language was selected for modeling the system, it is assumed any new design would also be
implemented with this standard. Therefore, a suite of SysML diagrams would be available (or
quickly generated) to the applicable stakeholders. This assumption is based on the remote
likelihood of selecting multiple MBSE standards. Should another language/method be selected,
the case study still provides an outline of system engineering practices that apply, and may be
implemented in a similar way with the tool(s) supporting those standards.

This test case is enhancing a legacy system used for Shuttle (and planned to support future
launch programs). The ground systems were modified from the Apollo program in the late1970’s/early-1980’s predating any formal MBSE standards. Subsequently, a mature design
exists, though it epitomizes a document-centric methodology that was predominant at that time.
For operational systems, the goal is not to model the entire system as this is not an efficient use
of resources. However, if the product life-cycle is to continue into the future, then incorporating
SysML elements to support system design changes may be appropriate. In this case, four of the
nine available SysML diagrams supported this effort to include:
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•

Package Diagram
o A Package Diagram is required to contain all other SysML diagrams generated, so
it is required for any SysML model. It is used simply to organize the model, and
works very similar to folders used within Windows. The package name is
included in the frame-label of all other diagrams.

•

Block Definition Diagram (BDD)
o BDD’s were developed to show the composition of the various subsystems
(LH2StorTankPressSys) and also as a way to graphically display elements stored
as blocks (components, failure modes). This supported scoping the system.

•

Internal Block Diagram (IBD)
o An IBD shows the internal workings of a single block to include the inner
connections of the parts and flow between them. The block ‘LH2StorTankPress’
was created and showed via additional blocks of all the components that
comprised this subsystem. An IBD was then created from the
‘LH2StorTankPress’ block. However, all the composite blocks included in the
BDD are changed to a property of ‘parts.’ A block shows a given component
used within the system, where as an IBD shows an instance of that part (block
equates to a part number – of which there may be many used - where an IBD part
refers to the unique identifier for that component). IBD’s were used to support
system scoping, FT development, failure-mode development and fault mapping.

•

Requirements Diagram
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o SysML has a very strong capability to track requirements from initiation to
closure. Requirements diagrams were used to develop the AD/FI application
requirements.

Model the AD/FI Applications
It could not be determined if both the AD and FI classes selected could fully meet the
requirements. This drove a need to model and test these methods to determine if they
incorporating them within the LH2 system was feasible.

Anomaly Detection Analysis
The first tests performed a sensitivity analysis of the K-Means method of detection. A single
cluster was simulated, and training data was selected. The initial variables represented:
•

Multiple data types (pressure, temperature, valve position)

•

Common value ranges (0-100%; 0-150 PSIG, 0-150 oF)

•

Dissimilar value ranges (0-150 and (-409)-(-423) oF; 0-150, 0-750 and 0-3000 PSIG)

These variables replicate actual indicators within the LH2 system, and the initial training data
values come from real data. However, they are not related to one another. They were selected as
the initial testing is looking for responses from a diverse dataset.

When a cluster is formed, only the high and low values from each element within the vector are
needed to determine a k-distance. The initial training data values were randomized to +/- 1%,
and the resulting high/low values retained. This simulates the influence of training data as each
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variable will have differing impacts to that baseline as corresponding value trends away from
nominal, and by raising the k-distance baseline above zero.

With training data simulated, a single indicator was incremented by 1% up to 5%. As the initial
1% increment will keep it within or near the training data high/low values, only a slight shift is
observed. As the increments continue, the baseline shifts grow. At 3%, the baseline has roughly
doubled, and at 5%, more than tripled. This test is repeated, but with five different indicators
being incremented (both high and low) as this mimics the data being related to one another. A
1% increment keeps all the test values within or near the training data high/lows, and a slight
increase is noted with four of the five increments. The initial starting value on the last indicator
was set outside the training data low value, so an upward increment brought it closer to its norm.
Overall, a slight upward trend is noted. Each is then increased by 2%, and the baseline nearly
triples.

Often, the data being tested is not as stable as shown previously. The same series of tests were
repeated, but this time with +/-1% of randomized noise simulated with the test data. The results
were similar, though the stable data plots stepped up while the noisy ones trended. Selecting a
threshold value is a subjective task and will likely be based on how the baseline plot is acting.
As a general rule for this case study, a doubling of the baseline should flag the operator of a
possible trend away from nominal. A tripling should indicate divergence from nominal (as
defined by the training data). A 100 PSIG system would have limits set at +/- 10%. Therefore,
the K-Means method would have flagged the operator well before an alarm is issued.
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The next test was specific to a requirement that was specifically developed to address an existing
limitation. During the requisite configuration changes for the various loading phases, the limit
settings are inhibited at the end of one phase, and activated (possibly to new levels) at the start of
the next phase. This essentially turns off the alarms during these transitions. To test the KMeans ability to monitor these transient conditions, data from STS-134 (training) and STS-135
(test) during an LH2 transition from Slow Fill to Fast Fill is used. When presented during the
case study, it was noted that there is an approximate 0.8 oF temperature bias between the two
mobile launch platforms used for these launches (an acceptable tolerance). This bias further
impacted the k-distance value due to the narrow range of the indicator in this timeframe.
However, as the bias exists during the entire plot, further examination is necessary.

The STS-134 & 135 LH2 Slow Fill to Fast Fill transitions were previously plotted (reference
figures 31 and 32). Both the pressure and temperature profiles, and the pressure values were
much alike. Only the temperature stood out due to the noted bias. The STS-135 transition plot
was changed to include the STS134 temperature (reference Figure 36 - STS-135 LH2 Loading
(SF to FF) with STS-134 Temp. This plot starts out with a k-distance between 5-6 (very high)
and remains above four throughout Slow Fill. During this time, a new cluster is being defined
with approximately a 2 PSIG increase on the three pressure indicators. As the temperature is bittoggling between 2 or 3 values, and a bit equates to 0.072 oF, the difference of the high/low
values for this cluster equate to a small number. So normalizing a value with 0.8 bias results in a
high k-distance value. During transition, a couple of spikes are noted, but these were also
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observed in the graph with only pressures plotted. The spike is elevated some from the pressureonly calculations, but a view of the vector element’s normalized values indicates all four
measurements contributed roughly the same to this spike.

Following the transition spikes, the k-distance drops to just over one. As the bias is still present,
this is unexpected. At this point, the three transfer line pressures have diverged to their Fast Fill
values, and a cyclic pattern can be observed as they track the ET vent valve cycling that
maintains back pressure on the tank. During this period, new clusters are being defined, but the
temperature measurement is more active. This larger gap (approximately 1.0 oF) between the
temperature’s high and low element values lowers the normalized value, and subsequently, the kdistance.

The final observation is related to the latter part of Fast Fill. Again, the temperature is bittoggling which drove the k-distance value significantly higher during Slow Fill. For Fast Fill, kdistance drops to approximately 0.5. What is also observed is that the STS-135 temperature has
dropped into a region where the STS-134 temperature had been active (training data), and the
three pressures had already started their Fast Fill profile. Therefore, the low k-distance value is
correlating to the activities immediately following the start of Fast Fill for STS-134, and not the
latter part of Fast Fill when it decreases to LH2 temperatures.
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Figure 36 - STS-135 LH2 Loading (SF to FF) with STS-134 Temp

This test highlights that when working with dynamic data, there may be times this data better fits
a cluster that does not reflect the same activity from which generated the test data. An
observation such as this is desired when doing post-test data reviews as the time is available to
resolve the issue. However, this was a non-issue that was initially depicted as off-nominal, and
with the bias remaining constant, later displayed as nominal. These are not the type of events
wanted for supporting real-time operations as they can distract the operators from their primary
goal of monitoring system operations.

160

Fault Isolation Analysis
The implementation selected involves generating a knowledgebase which is a straightforward
task. However, there is an open issue regarding inclusion of single vs. multiple fault modes as
follows:
•

If the knowledgebase is to include multiple-fault failures:
o Should it be limited to auxiliary and/or secondary subsystems that are activated
due to a failure on the primary subsystem?
o Should it include the possibility of dual failures within a related subsystem (i.e.
a regulator fails open and the corresponding relief valve fails to open)?
o Should it include components that may be impacted due to failure propagation
thru the system (i.e. an over-pressurization due to relief valve failure)?

As this task is comprehensive, the initial focus should be including all single-fault modes that
can be detected by instrumentation. It can also include auxiliary or secondary subsystems as
these will be common to the primary side (and are often active and being monitored). As the
goal is to present likely candidates, including multiple failures will likely generate lengthy lists
with many unrealistic scenarios. This is a knowledgebase, so the user always has the option to
include multi-failures they deem credible or have experienced in the past.

Proposed Framework
With the case study concluded and an analysis of the applicable elements performed, a proposed
framework will be summarized. This updates the preliminary version and incorporates
additional detail gathered during the study process.
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•

Scope the system
o Determine the extent of the system to be augmented
o Identify existing AD/FI capabilities

•



Avoid duplication of existing techniques



Rule out subsystem inclusion or failure types if already supplemented

Generate Requirements
o Include both cost and functional related requirements
o Generate initial requirements at a higher level


Do not want to restrict initial AD/FI classes to consider

•

Identify/categorize sensors

•

Identify/categorize fault modes
o Initially done at the component level, and then applied generically to like
components

•

Research available AD/FI technologies
o Consider:


Commercially available applications



Mature development (algorithm(s) constructed and tested)



Conceptual techniques with supporting test results from multiple origins

o Categorized technologies into classes with common underlying methodologies
•

Down select to an AD and FI class that best meets requirements

•

Model the system
o For existing systems, model elements of system that will support AD/FI testing
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•

Model the AD/FI techniques
o If testing proves application is unacceptable, consider next AD or FI class

•

Perform trade studies of available options within the class
o Can include existing applications or new development

•

Make recommendation

Some of these tasks outlined above may also be performed in parallel. The process flow diagram
has also been updated to reflect the proposed framework (reference Figure 37 - Proposed ADFI
Selection Framework). The following highlights the changes to the final version:
•

Generating requirements was added as its own step prior to identifying sensors and fault
modes
o This task was originally embedded within the Identify AD/FI applications block
o Knowing the requirements may provide insight as whether listing all sensors
and/or fault modes is required

•

Down-select to AD and FI classes was added following steps to gather system and
AD/FI information.
o As the research uncovered numerous potential methods, a means to limit the
modeling and testing was a required intermediate step
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bdd [package] ADFI_Apps [ADFI_SelectionFramework]
«block»
Scope_System

Determine extent of the system under study
Identify existing AD/FI capabilities
Rule out subsystems with augmented AD/FI

«block»
Generate_Requirements

«block»
Identify_Categorize_Sensors

«block»
Identify_Categorize_Fault_Modes

Initially done at the component level, and
then applied generically to like
components

Include both cost and functional related requirements
Generate initial requirements at a higher level
Do not want to restrict initial AD/FI classes to consider

«block»
Research_ADFI_Technologies

Categorized technologies
into classes with common
underlying methodologies

«block»
DownSelect_ADFI_Class

For existing systems, model
elements of system that will
support AD/FI testing

«block»
Model_System

«block»
Model_ADFI_Techniques

«block»
Perform_Trade_Studies

«block»
Make_Recommendation

Figure 37 - Proposed ADFI Selection Framework
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Fails

Can include existing applications
or new development

Framework Validation
To validate the framework, this process will be implemented on the liquid oxygen (LOX) system
that supported ET loadings for launch. This system is also planned to be used with the nextgeneration of NASA rockets. Liquid oxygen is also a cryogenic fluid and provides the oxidizer
used by the Shuttle’s main engines.

The various KSC systems that operate out of the control room share the same C&C architecture,
and subsequently, there is commonality as to how the existing AD and FI capabilities currently
function. Therefore, many of the framework processes implemented during the case study are
also applicable to these other varied systems. A system engineering best practice is to reuse any
applicable artifacts as this both reduces effort by not recreating them and keeps the content
consistent when used across a spectrum of disciplines. When possible,

The LOX system loading operations also take place late in the launch countdown. They are both
hazardous and time-critical, so this system could also benefit from AD/FI augmentation. As
LOX is much heavier than LH2, one of the main differences between these two systems is LOX
requires the use of large cryogenic pumps (primary and secondary) to load the vehicle. LH2 is
loaded by pressure only, so lacks any comparable hardware. Therefore, the scope for this effort
will encompass the LOX pump subsystem.

The C&C subsystem has its own health and status capabilities, so this will be excluded from
consideration. If a leak occurs, LOX does not pose the same threat as LH2, so it does not have a
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supporting leak and fire subsystem. As cryogenic fluids produce large vapor clouds when
exposed to ambient temperatures, the pad camera system will be used to identify leaks. Limit
setting is the primary method of AD for this system.

With the scope defined, the requirements can be generated. The requirements developed for
LH2 were reviewed, and as these are generally high-level (and not system specific), they were
found to be applicable to LOX. Subsequently, the research and ranking of the AD and FI
applications is also applicable. The LOX sensor and fault modes will be needed for the FI
application, so they are added to the SysML model. Some of the LOX components within the
pump subsystem are of the same type as LH2, so the generic fault modes for these items can be
ported over to the LOX model.

As the down-select classes are suitable for the LOX system, the K-Means method will be used
for AD. Training data was pulled from the STS-134 mission during the Replenish loading phase.
Replenish operations follow the initial tank loading, and keep the ET liquid level at flight mass
to compensate for the boil-off of cryogen fluids. It is during Replenish when the astronauts can
board the Shuttle, and this phase can last 4 to 10 hours. Four measurements related to pump
performance include thrust bearing temperature, bearing oil temperature, current applied to the
variable frequency drive and pump outlet flow (GPM). The data is plotted over an approximate
4-hour window, and no obvious anomalies are observed (reference Figure 38 - STS-134 LOX
Pump - Replenish).
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Figure 38 - STS-134 LOX Pump - Replenish

During Replenish operations for STS-135, a leak occurred on the pump after approximately three
hours of Replenish. It started slowly, and very gradually worsened (reference Figure 39 - STS135 LOX Pump – Replenish (k-distance)). After nearly an hour, the pump was secured and the
secondary pump brought online to support a successful launch. The STS-135 pump plot includes
the corresponding k-distance plot. Even with a couple of noisy indicators, the k-distance forms a
stable baseline. When the pump temperatures start to drop, the upward deflection on k-distance
is quite apparent signaling an off-nominal trend.
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Figure 39 - STS-135 LOX Pump – Replenish (k-distance)

For a leak failure, camera views are the primary method for both detection and isolation. Cold
vapors are the norm in the storage area as there are uninsulated pipes (in addition to the pumps)
that experience cryogenic temperatures. When a leak occurs, these vapors will tend to envelop
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the area of origin which is an indicator for the operator. Leaks can occur anywhere in the
cryogenic systems, though fastened joints are the primary source. Rarely are temperature
sensors ideally located to capture external leaks, so having these measurements corroborate a
leak is unique. These indicators are installed to monitor the pump’s bearings in which the failure
mode is high temperature. The two LOX pumps are swapped operationally with each loading so
they are both exposed to run time. The secondary pump’s thrust bearing temp typically
approaches its limit when the loads are at their highest (Fast Fill), and the pump speed is reduced
slightly so it stays within specification (temperature and operator actions create entirely different
pump profiles which must be considered when selecting training data).

For the FI knowledgebase, perhaps only the high limit was considered a valid failure mode for
these indicators. This could then be remedied by simply adding the low value faults. A model
update would be more complicated requiring one with adequate skills to accomplish the task. If
the model is configuration controlled, then there are additional reviews and approvals required.
This highlights how an internal knowledgebase provides more flexibility in being sustained. If it
is adequately providing FI capabilities, then this ease of maintenance should be a factor involved
if a decision to choose an FI model is needed.

The framework provided a process that was used to select AD/FI applications for the LOX
system. The hardware was scoped to the pump subsystem as there are no pumps on the LH2
system that was used in the case study. However, when possible, actions accomplished during
the case study that were applicable to the LOX system were not repeated if the results were not
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expected to change. This was primarily related to requirements generation. Although the
hardware differed significantly, the existing AD/FI capabilities were common (as they are to
most systems in the launch control room). This validates the decision to go forward with KMeans AD (via the IMS application) and generating an internal knowledgebase to incorporate FI
capabilities, and therefore, the AD/FI selection framework. It is noted that K-Means could
potentially have issues related to real-time operations. However, as these issues are understood,
they can also be overcome with methods to control the training data utilized combined with the
flexibility IMS provides in tuning the model.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
This research proposes a framework to be used by organizations with a need to enhance system
anomaly detection and fault isolation capabilities. This chapter will summarize the effort,
highlight resulting contributions, describe a limitation encountered and recommend future work
to further expand this subject matter.

Summary
Chapter 1 introduces a need to improve upon existing anomaly detection and fault isolation
capabilities for critical systems. It points out that there are other methods available, but the
applications selected for implementation do not always provide the anticipated benefit. A
problem statement is formulated and potential research objectives defined.

Chapter 2 performs a literature review and confirms many new AD/FI techniques have been
reported. The review also focuses on systems engineering approaches to select and implement
this technology. Minimal research was uncovered that addresses the implementation of these
new AD/FI technologies. Furthermore, literature describing current systems engineering
practices did not deal with inclusion of AD/FI technologies. A gap analysis is performed
indicating additional research is warranted.

Chapter 3 organizes and defines the methodology that will be used for this research project. It
depicts the development of an initial framework followed by a case study for time-critical,
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highly-hazardous system. The resulting (finalized) framework would be validated and the
research effort summarized.

Chapter 4 produces an initial framework to provide guidance on AD/FI selection incorporating
system engineering practices. It settles on a model-based system engineering approach and
selects SysML as the standard to support the MBSE modeling. It describes a detailed process
flow for identifying requirements, the system under consideration, and the AD/FI technologies
candidates. Determining if requirements can be satisfied drives modeling of the techniques for
testing. Most of the system modeling can be accomplished within the SysML tool. Testing the
candidate applications required functionality beyond SysML capabilities. The framework
process ends with an evaluation of the applications followed by a recommendation.

Chapter 5 conducts the case study with a focus on the liquid hydrogen system at KSC. Liquid
hydrogen is used to fuel the Space Shuttle’s main engines (as well as the next generation NASA
rockets). These are highly-hazardous and time-critical operations executed from a remotely
located control room. Thus supplemental AD/FI technologies could be valuable additions. This
study follows the initial framework while scrutinizing the individual steps in an effort to enhance
the process steps. As modeling the new technologies proves time consuming (many lack
adequate detail and/or contain proprietary information), an intermediate step was added to the
process flow to down-select to a classes of common techniques. The modeling effort, and
subsequent testing, then focuses on those methods. For this case study, the choice came down to
a single application (both AD and FI), or internal development. A recommendation is made to
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go forward with an AD application, and internally develop a means to provide fault mapping to
accommodate the FI requirements.

Chapter 6 analyzes both the framework methodology leading to the selection process and the
chosen applications ability to meet the system requirements. The proposed framework
incorporates the refinements noted during the case study and those generated from the analysis to
establish a ‘finalized’ product. This framework is then validated against the liquid oxygen
system also located at KSC. The AD application successfully signaled a downward trend in two
indicators used to monitor pump bearing performance. The failure mode was attributed to a
failed seal resulting in a liquid oxygen leak at the pump. The AD plotted (k-distance) value had
flagged the off-nominal trend well before an alarm was triggered.

Chapter 7 concludes the research effort by summarizing the overall project. It also describes the
research contributions realized, limitations encountered during the study, and a recommendation
for future work to continue the study of related topics.

Framework
The detection/isolation technologies described herein go above what is readily available, or
currently implemented, in industry (and providing adequate coverage). Therefore, the customer
for this technology will have critical need(s) to offset the costs and/or effort. These can include
systems that are: (a) large, complex, costly; (b) highly-hazardous; (c) time-critical; (d) remote
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operated (e) expensive when idle. The framework developed recognizes this customer profile, as
well as the necessity to provide a value-added result. Advantages realized by this framework:
•

It adheres to systems engineering practices.
o Organizations with systems requiring such applications are likely practicing
system engineering, so will be consistent with their current policies.

•

Uses MBSE methodology implemented with SysML
o Organizations using same methods may already have much of their systems
adequately modeled

•

Selection process is requirements driven
o If it cannot be determined that technologies under consideration fully meet
requirements, drives additional modeling/testing to test capabilities
o Validates the model prior to making recommendations

•

Objective process, so minimizes impact from biased stakeholders

Contributions
This dissertation is the first attempt to develop a framework with strict adherence to system
engineering practices to improve and optimize system fault detection and isolation. The primary
contribution is the framework itself as it provides a novel strategy to implementing new
technology that can enhance system performance. It lays out a systematic approach to assist
users in generating anomaly detection and fault isolation schema supporting existing or new
designs. This directly addresses the original problem statement that initiated this research project.
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Additional contributions include:
•

Extending SysML to include generic component failures. This data was combined with
existing Internal Block Diagrams components to auto-generate a fault tree (proof-ofconcept demonstrated).

•

Extend the contributions of those developing AD/FI technologies by providing a means
to organize the detectors/isolators for consideration, and subsequently, acceptance for
implementation should the capabilities meet the desired requirements

•

Couple AD and/or FI with unique applications for which they were never intended. Path
to generating AD/FI classes may uncover needs that could benefit from the underlying
detection/isolation techniques

•

Improve accuracy in anomaly detection and fault isolation capabilities by pairing those
deemed optimal for the given environment in which they will operate

Limitations
A limitation encountered was that the systems under study, for the most part, shared the same
requirements. These two systems were identified early in this project (LH2 and LOX), and the
actual hardware selected for modeling/testing was (purposely) dissimilar. However, as the
command and control system is common among all the systems operating out of the control
room, the requirements did not change enough to drive the down-select to another class of AD or
FI candidates. Ultimately, the model testing did show the selected classes were effective for
both systems, even with the disparity in hardware tested. On the flip-side, the LH2/LOX testing
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may be a test-case indicating these applications can be implemented for all systems operating out
of the control room.

Future Work
The ability to automatically create an initial fault tree from a SysML IBD was illustrated. This
relied on exporting a relationship matrix linking the IBD components to fault modes added to the
SysML. The next logical step is to create new ‘stereotypes’ of the applicable model elements
(further extension of the model) that can capture multiple component layering within an IBD.
This information can then be passed to external applications via the SysML export standard (vs.
a 2-dimensional matrix) for auto-generation use.

The construction of a system fault map was identified as being a comprehensive task. If SysML
is extended to assign faults to components (as per the fault tree example above), then it can be
further extended to associate indicator responses to a given component/fault combination. This
too can be exported to an application for auto-generation of system fault maps.

The K-Means method of anomaly detection requires ingestion of training data where the user
determines the sensitivity level in which the clusters are generated. It also allows for adjusting
the sensitivity of the individual elements within a vector. Additional research should be pursued
to include:
•

Optimization of cluster sizing
o To include high sensitivity for post-test reviews
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o To include low sensitivity for real-time operations
•

Optimization of individual test parameter settings

•

Optimization for threshold (alarm) setting

•

Testing for biases between datasets

•

Testing for anomalies within the (unsupervised) training data

•

Testing (and handling) of very narrow high/low ranges for data that will be
normalized.

With limited data streams and display space to monitor the system, research that can integrate
AD/FI technologies into a single application would provide value. With two applications
running standalone, they are not going to be designed to communicate with one-another.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that either will be directly tied into the C&C network. An integrated
application can react to its self-generated alarms driving it to fetch the corresponding faults.

Further testing of the framework outside of a space operations environment. This addresses the
‘narrow-testing’ limitation identified earlier, and would provide further confidence that this
framework is appropriate for broad-industry use.
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